6.5 | Planning and preparation for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, January to March 2003

with post-conflict situations, a unique legitimacy in doing so and that was our

preferred route.”568

1333. Sir Peter added that the FCO was:

“… very doubtful indeed about the neo-con assumption that international forces would

be welcomed as liberators and … that somehow very quickly Iraqi political life would

resume and the occupying forces would not carry these responsibilities … We warned

Ministers that this would be a long period of post-conflict work for the international

community, which is why we then said that we thought it was important that, if

possible, the UN should take on the lead.”569

1334. Mr Chilcott commented that, in the IPU:

“… because it was contingency planning, because right up until the last moment

we didn’t know for sure that we were going to be involved in the military action, that

maybe psychologically had an effect on us …”570

1335. Witnesses commented on the responsibilities and priorities of different

departments.

1336. Ms Short stated that DFID “got down to planning against all eventualities within

the difficult atmosphere we had in Whitehall about communications”.571 The principal

planning failure had been the UK and US military’s failure to plan for “catastrophic

success”.572 Rapid military success followed by ethnic conflict had been foreseen

as a risk, but the military “didn’t prepare for their Geneva Convention obligations” of

keeping order and providing basic humanitarian relief.573

1337. Sir Suma Chakrabarti saw the FCO as the natural lead department for

post-conflict issues.574 He commented that the FCO was “more focused on the

second resolution than planning for the day after … There was a vision for Iraq that

I think the Foreign Office put together … So there was thinking going on, but, yes,

second resolution was the main issue in their minds, no doubt.”

1338. Lord Jay told the Inquiry that “the FCO and DFID were not on the same page

in the lead-up to the war … because … there were differences between our Ministers

on the desirability and the likelihood of war … What we were faced with … was not

something which DFID had been geared up to do or Clare Short found comfortable.”575

568 Public hearing, 1 December 2009, page 30.

569 Public hearing, 1 December 2009, page 65.

570 Public hearing, 8 December 2009, pages 47-48.

571 Public hearing, 2 February 2010, page 48.

572 Public hearing, 2 February 2010, page 46.

573 Public hearing, 2 February 2010, page 47.

574 Public hearing, 8 December 2009, page 55.

575 Public hearing, 30 June 2010, page 72.

547