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The Report of the Iraq Inquiry
would have to decide how best to employ the 0.5% who did not have a perfect fit …
NBC clothing and canisters were also no longer problem areas, although desert
camouflage NBC suits were not yet available (but this was only a matter of their
colour, not the materials). COLPRO was not being raised in theatre as a significant
problem. The only outstanding issue on ComboPens was providing 600 to the
BBC …”203
417.  An updated paper on NBC respirator policy was sent to the Chiefs of Staff on
11 March.204 It stated that alternative solutions to the fitting problem and the expected
0.5 percent of individuals who failed to achieve an optimum fit had been, and continued
to be, “vigorously pursued” with DSTL and industry. Three possible solutions had
emerged but it was impossible to predict whether or when these could be fielded,
“but certainly not before 17th March”.
418.  The DJW intended to provide “a field commander’s risk guide” to Lt Gen Reith
by 13 March on deploying individuals who could not achieve an optimum fit.
419.  The guide was circulated on 12 March.205
420.  In his report following a visit to see the forces preparing for operations in Kuwait,
General Sir Mike Jackson, Chief of the General Staff from February 2003 to August
2006, wrote on 10 March:
“The one area of the media feeding frenzy that has some justification lies in the
readiness of stocks for expeditionary operations. The introduction of resource
accounting has created an imperative to drive down stockholdings. As a result, in
the name of accounting orthodoxy we lack basic items such as desert clothing. I am
unsure whether the cost of storing such items would really have been more than the
inflated price we have no doubt paid by procurement under UOR action, but I am
certain of the negative impact on the moral component that failure to provide these
items has had.”206
421.  Gen Jackson wrote that the root of the problem was “partly financial, but also
systemic” and there was no mechanism “within the Central Staff to safeguard the
operational logistic interest”. This had led to “a consistent lack of visibility” of the state
of UK holdings.
The situation in the week before the invasion
422.  Adm Boyce assured Mr Blair that there were “no serious equipment
problems” on 13 March.
203  Minute APS/Minister(DP) to CM(SD), 10 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Op TELIC – UORs’.
204  Minute DJW to COSSEC, 11 March 2003, ‘OP TELIC – NBC Respirator Policy’.
205  Minute DJW, 12 March 2003, ‘Commanders’ Guide to Respirator Best Fit Risk Assessment’.
206  Minute CGS to CDS, 10 March 2003, ‘CGS Visit to Op TELIC’.
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