The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
would have
to decide how best to employ the 0.5% who did not have a perfect
fit …
NBC
clothing and canisters were also no longer problem areas, although
desert
camouflage
NBC suits were not yet available (but this was only a matter of
their
colour, not
the materials). COLPRO was not being raised in theatre as a
significant
problem.
The only outstanding issue on ComboPens was providing 600 to
the
417.
An updated
paper on NBC respirator policy was sent to the Chiefs of Staff
on
11 March.204
It stated
that alternative solutions to the fitting problem and the
expected
0.5 percent
of individuals who failed to achieve an optimum fit had been, and
continued
to be,
“vigorously pursued” with DSTL and industry. Three possible
solutions had
emerged but
it was impossible to predict whether or when these could be
fielded,
“but certainly
not before 17th March”.
418.
The DJW
intended to provide “a field commander’s risk guide” to Lt Gen
Reith
by 13 March
on deploying individuals who could not achieve an optimum
fit.
419.
The guide was
circulated on 12 March.205
420.
In his report
following a visit to see the forces preparing for operations in
Kuwait,
General Sir
Mike Jackson, Chief of the General Staff from February 2003 to
August
2006, wrote
on 10 March:
“The one
area of the media feeding frenzy that has some justification lies
in the
readiness
of stocks for expeditionary operations. The introduction of
resource
accounting
has created an imperative to drive down stockholdings. As a result,
in
the name of
accounting orthodoxy we lack basic items such as desert clothing. I
am
unsure
whether the cost of storing such items would really have been more
than the
inflated
price we have no doubt paid by procurement under UOR action, but I
am
certain of
the negative impact on the moral component that failure to provide
these
421.
Gen Jackson
wrote that the root of the problem was “partly financial, but
also
systemic”
and there was no mechanism “within the Central Staff to safeguard
the
operational
logistic interest”. This had led to “a consistent lack of
visibility” of the state
of UK
holdings.
422.
Adm Boyce
assured Mr Blair that there were “no serious
equipment
problems”
on 13 March.
203
Minute
APS/Minister(DP) to CM(SD), 10 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Op TELIC –
UORs’.
204
Minute DJW
to COSSEC, 11 March 2003, ‘OP TELIC – NBC Respirator
Policy’.
205
Minute DJW,
12 March 2003, ‘Commanders’ Guide to Respirator Best Fit Risk
Assessment’.
206
Minute CGS
to CDS, 10 March 2003, ‘CGS Visit to Op TELIC’.
66