3.6 |
Development of UK strategy and options, November 2002 to January
2003
241.
On 9
December, the FCO issued the formal request seeking
Lord Goldsmith’s
advice on
whether a further decision by the Security Council would be
required
before
force could be used to secure Iraq’s compliance with its
disarmament
obligations.
242.
The request
stated that Lord Goldsmith’s advice was not needed
“now”.
243.
The content of
the letter from Mr Michael Wood, FCO Legal Adviser,
to
Lord Goldsmith78
and the
meeting held at Lord Goldsmith’s request with No.10
officials
on
19 December,79
are
addressed in Section 5.
244.
Mr Blair
was advised on 11 December that there was impatience in the
US
Administration
and it “looked intent on military action in
February/March”.
245.
There was a
need to build “the strongest possible case” that
Saddam
Hussein was
in material breach of his obligations and “the widest
possible
international
support for action” through a second resolution.
246.
Sir David
Manning and Sir Richard Dearlove had a joint meeting with
Dr Rice and
Mr George
Tenet, the Director of Central Intelligence, in Washington on 9
December.80
247.
Sir David
reported to Mr Blair that Dr Rice had “clearly been
provoked” by Saddam
Hussein’s
“challenge that it was up to us to prove he had WMD rather than up
to him to
prove he
did not”. She was:
“…
confident that the [Iraqi] declaration would be a sham. The [US]
Administration
would in
due course declare it deficient and say that Saddam was in
material
breach. But
she again accepted that this would not amount to a casus
belli.”
248.
Dr Rice
had “made no effort to hide the fact that the Administration would
now be
looking to
build the case for early military action … probably mid/late
February as we
suspected”.
But she had:
“… denied
that military planning was dictating the timetable. The need to
resolve
the crisis
quickly was dictated by political factors. Internally … President
[Bush] was
being
‘griddled’. Externally, the international community … would soon
lose their
nerve if
they began to doubt our determination to impose disarmament on
Saddam
if he did
not disarm himself. And if we let the inspections process run, and
Blix found
nothing as
was only too likely, the Russians, French and others would deride
US and
UK claims …
leaving us exposed and Saddam strengthened.”
78
Letter Wood
to Adams, 9 December 2002, ‘Iraq: Security Council Resolution 1441
(2002)’.
79
Minute
Brummell, 19 December 2002, ‘Iraq: Note of Meeting at No. 10
Downing Street – 4.00 pm,
19 December
2002’.
80
Minute
Manning to Prime Minister, 11 December 2002, ‘Iraq’.
45