The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

650.  Mr Webb commented on Dr Brewer’s letter on 27 February.281 He suggested to

Mr Lee that there were “wider consequences for the overall success of the campaign

from the effectiveness of the CIMIC [civil-military] component, to which we should draw

Ministers’ attention collectively”.

651.  Sir Kevin Tebbit, who saw Dr Brewer’s letter a few days later, commented on

7 March:

“The problem here is that DFID have a wrong view of what the Armed Forces can

or should do to administer humanitarian relief, as distinct from civil, UN and NGO

agencies – including DFID themselves.”282

652.  Mr Blair told Cabinet on 27 February that humanitarian and reconstruction

planning needed to take “centre stage” and that he would raise the issue with

President Bush.

653.  In Cabinet on 27 February, Mr Hoon reported on his meeting with General Franks

in Qatar the previous day (see Section 3.7).283 Mr Hoon had discussed concerns with

General Franks that:

“Not enough planning had been done on the post-conflict phase of operations,

including humanitarian relief. British forces could find themselves in charge of a

portion of Iraq quite quickly if resistance to Coalition military action collapsed. It

would be helpful if experts from the Department for International Development could

work with military planners in the region and consider pre-positioning humanitarian

supplies so that there was no hiatus in the event that military action took place.”

654.  Ms Short told Cabinet that experts had been involved in talks in the Pentagon.

Preparations were “just beginning and needed to be expedited”. A UN legal mandate

was “essential” for the humanitarian and reconstruction tasks that lay ahead. Without

that, “proper preparation was impossible”. That matter “needed to become a priority

for the Coalition”. It would be “difficult” to accommodate action in Iraq within her

department’s contingency reserve: “Greater resources were likely to be needed.”

655.  The Inquiry considers that Ms Short’s reluctance to prepare for a wider UK

post-conflict role, though not critical to the outcome, and consistent with DFID’s

statutory role, contributed to the Government’s failure to ensure that the UK was

adequately prepared and resourced to carry out its likely obligations in Iraq.

656.  Mr Blair said that he would continue to push for a further Security Council

resolution.284 President Bush’s commitments the previous day on the MEPP

281 Manuscript comment Webb to DG Op Pol, 27 February 2003, on Letter Brewer to Bowen,

24 February 2003, [untitled].

282 Manuscript comment Tebbit, 7 March 2003, on Letter Brewer to Bowen, 24 February 2003, [untitled].

283 Cabinet Conclusions, 27 February 2003.

284 Cabinet Conclusions, 27 February 2003.

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