The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
•
the need
for sustained monitoring and mentoring of the ISF beyond 1 July
2004;
and
•
the
endorsement of the CENTCOM Strategic Concept to transfer
security
responsibilities
to Iraqi forces that would permit a reduction in the
numbers
of
Coalition Forces needed to perform internal security tasks. The
timelines
envisaged
were:
{{local
transfer by 1 July 2004;
{{regional
transfer by 1 September 2004; and
{{national
transfer by September 2006.
370.
The report
recommended that:
•
The
training and equipping programmes for the IPS should be
accelerated
significantly,
the numbers of police increased and the Coalition military given
the
task of
training, equipping, mentoring and certifying them.
•
The ICDC
should be renamed the Iraqi Civil Guard, be recognised as
an
enduring
organisation (possibly a gendarmerie‑type force) under the control
of
the IMOD,
have its strength increased from 36 to 43 battalions and be
given
professional
development.
•
The Iraqi
Army’s focus should remain on external threats but its training
rate
could be
reduced (to allow more rapid development of other security
forces).320
371.
The summary of
the report produced for the Chiefs of Staff stated:
“… the UK,
through MND(SE), is regarded as the leader in ‘best practice’;
in
particular
the objective monitoring, mentoring and certification of Iraqi
security
forces. As
such we will be asked to assist in developing this programme
throughout
372.
The Eikenberry
Review was discussed by the Iraq Senior Officials Group
on
3 February.322
The minutes
described Maj Gen Eikenberry’s recommendations
for
security
structures as “acceptable” but said that proposals that IMOD and
SSR
structures
should sit under the new Multi National Force (MNF) command were
“less to
our
liking”.
320
Paper
Clissitt, 1 February 2004, ‘Iraq Security Force Assessment Team
(ISFAT) Initial Findings:
Brief for
OPCOS’.
321
Paper
Clissitt, 1 February 2004, ‘Iraq Security Force Assessment Team
(ISFAT) Initial Findings:
Brief for
OPCOS’.
322
Minute Dodd
to Buck, 5 February 2004, ‘Iraq: Senior Officials
Group’.
138