The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
treatment
of prisoners was an unknown concept.” Prisoners were, at the
time,
being held
in the theatre internment facility designed for prisoners of
war.
•
The
difference between the social norms and attitudes of the Occupying
Powers
and the
local people and their neighbours in the wider region. That
divergence
was going
to be a significant issue: “If the [Coalition Powers] are going to
ensure
that their
values and concept of human rights are respected in Iraq,
excellent.
Equally, if
they feel that legally they cannot change Iraqi society on those
lines,
it would be
helpful for that reality to be spelt out. This is particularly
relevant to
policing,
as any international officer serving in Iraq could not be
associated with
operational
policing which did not reflect the human rights position of their
parent
country.
Ambiguity and obfuscation would not survive long in the glare of
media
and
domestic political scrutiny.”
204.
After
returning to the UK from a visit to Iraq, Mr Blair sent a
personal note to
President
Bush.166
Sir David
Manning provided copies to Mr Straw, Mr Hoon,
Mr Watkins
and
Mr Powell, but instructed “It must not go wider”.
205.
Mr Blair
wrote that:
“… the task
is absolutely awesome and I’m not at all sure we’re geared for it.
This is
worse than
re‑building a country from scratch.”
206.
He went on to
explain that security in Baghdad had to be dealt with at once;
police
training
was vital and urgent.
207.
During May,
the CPA Interior Ministry’s International Police Assistance Team
(IPAT)
–
comprising 15 policing experts from the UK, US, Canada and Denmark
– carried
out an
assessment of the Iraqi police, to inform the CPA’s plans for
reconstituting and
developing
policing in Iraq.167
The
Coalition had originally intended to conduct the
policing
assessment as part of a wider justice sector assessment; however,
because
“the law
and order situation was in a critical state of disarray … the …
priority was
defined as
establishing the police forces” and the work on policing was taken
forward in
advance of
wider work on the justice sector. The team produced a 56‑page
assessment
of the
state and future of policing in Iraq on 30 May.
208.
The IPAT
assessed that the law and order situation varied across Iraq.
It
explained
that the arrangements for recalling and reinstating the Iraqi
police had varied
geographically
and that individual Coalition commanders had taken different
approaches
to the
training and re‑use of existing police:
“This
effectively began the creation of four potentially different police
forces in Iraq:
North,
Central, South Central and South.”
166
Letter
Manning to McDonald, 2 June 2003, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s Note’
attaching Note,
‘Note’.
167
Report CPA
Interior Ministry, 30 May 2003, ‘Iraq Police: An Assessment of the
Present and
Recommendations
for the Future’.
104