The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
In the
letter, Saddam Hussein declared that Iraq was “totally clear of all
nuclear, chemical
and
biological weapons”; and challenged President Bush’s “insinuation”
that Iraq was
linked to
the attacks on 9/11 and international terrorism.
Iraq’s
position in its letters and statements to the UN, and the UK
responses, are
addressed
in more detail in Section 3.5.
560.
In the
Foreword to the dossier, Mr Blair emphasised Iraq’s WMD
capabilities
and the
potential threat they posed.293
The full
text of the Foreword is set out in the
Box below.
The Inquiry has highlighted in bold text the points it regards as
particularly
important
in relation to the assessment of Iraq WMD capabilities and
intent.
The
document published today is based, in large part, on the work of
the Joint Intelligence
Committee
(JIC). The JIC is at the heart of the British intelligence
machinery. It is
chaired by
the Cabinet Office and made up of the heads of the UK’s three
Intelligence
and
Security Agencies, the Chief of Defence Intelligence, and senior
officials from key
government
departments. For over 60 years the JIC has provided regular
assessments
to successive
Prime Ministers and senior colleagues on a wide range of foreign
policy
and international
security issues.294
Its work,
like the material it analyses, is largely secret. It is
unprecedented for the
Government
to publish this kind of document but in the
light of the debate about Iraq
and Weapons
of Mass Destruction (WMD), I wanted to share with the British
public
the reasons
why I believe this issue to be a current and serious threat to the
UK
national
interest.
In recent
months, I have been increasingly alarmed by the evidence
from inside
Iraq
that
despite sanctions, despite the damage done to his capability in the
past, despite
the UN
Security Council resolutions expressly outlawing it, and
despite his
denials,
Saddam
Hussein is continuing to develop WMD, and with them the ability to
inflict
real damage
on the region, and the stability of the world.
Gathering
intelligence from inside Iraq is not easy. Saddam’s is one of the
most secretive
and
dictatorial regimes in the world. So I believe
people will understand why the
Agencies
cannot be specific about the sources, which have formed the
judgements
in this
document, and why we cannot publish everything we know.
We cannot,
of
course,
publish the detailed raw intelligence. I and other
Ministers have been briefed in
detail on the
intelligence and are satisfied as to its authority.
I also want to
pay tribute
to our
Intelligence and Security Services for the often extraordinary work
that they do.
293
Iraq’s
Weapons of Mass Destruction. The Assessment of the British
Government, 24
September 2002,
page
3.
294
The role
and composition of the JIC is set out in Section 2.
218