6.1 |
Development of the military options for an invasion of
Iraq
423.
A speaking
note stated that the key points for the meeting with Mr Blair
were:
•
US military
planning was “gathering pace”.
•
The “mood
and timetable” pointed to “this winter for action, although
an
alternative
would be in 2003/4”.
•
There was a
“need for early guidance on UK military involvement
and
preparatory
work”.
•
Engagement
between Mr Blair and President Bush was “needed now
to
assess US
willingness to establish [a] strategic framework, followed by
UK
decision‑making
before summer break”.
424.
The “Line to
Take” offered to Mr Hoon included:
•
It was “too
early to judge” if the US military plan was a winning concept and
the
Chiefs of
Staff were “not yet convinced”. The question of whether the US had
a
winning
concept could be answered as planning developed. The UK view
was
that
pressure should be “applied from South, West and
North”.
•
The US
would like to establish the scale of UK involvement. Subject to the
legal
framework,
the US expected Diego Garcia, Cyprus, air enablers, maritime
force
and Special
Forces as a minimum. There was a “Developing expectation” of
a
division
size force in the North with Turkey and other allies.
•
Decisions
were “needed urgently” if UK forces were to be involved “this
winter”.
A large
land force contribution needed “preparatory action immediately”
and
would not
be complete until “March/April”.
425.
Commenting on
Mr Bowen’s advice, Mr Watkins wrote that: “Large
scale
involvement
in a US thrust from Kuwait would be impracticable”; and that a
division
(minus)
option “would require immediate action on UORs etc and early
decisions
(October)
on reserves”. The latter would “definitely be
visible”.185
426.
In relation to
a discrete “Land Contribution”, Mr Watkins wrote:
“Apart from
being ‘involved’, the military utility (and risks) of this option
are not clear.”
427.
Mr Watkins
added to the speaking note a suggestion that Mr Hoon should
seek an
understanding
that the costs of UORs would be met from the Reserve.
428.
Mr Watkins
also offered Mr Hoon a “Private Office distillation of where
we think
most of
your key advisers – Chiefs, PUS etc (with possible exception of
Simon Webb) –
are coming
from”. That set out strong reservations about military action,
including
that there
was no objective justification for a pre‑emptive attack either now
or in the
185
Manuscript
comment Watkins on Minute
Bowen to PS/Secretary of State [MOD], 22 July 2002,
‘Iraq: Meeting
with the Prime Minister’.
186
Note
(handwritten) Watkins to SofS [MOD], 22 July 2002 attaching ‘Iraq:
Summary’.
239