7 |
Conclusions: Pre-conflict strategy and planning
to Iraq …
[I] think, one could say this is one of his primary national
security concerns
given the
nature of Al Qaida.”148
309.
The JIC
assessed that Iraq was likely to mount a terrorist attack only
in
response to
military action and if the existence of the regime was
threatened.
310.
The JIC
Assessment of 10 October 2002 stated that Saddam Hussein’s
“overriding
objective”
was to “avoid a US attack that would threaten his
regime”.149
The JIC
judged
that, in
the event of US-led military action against Iraq, Saddam
would:
“… aim to
use terrorism or the threat of it. Fearing the US response, he is
likely to
weigh the
costs and benefits carefully in deciding the timing and
circumstances in
which
terrorism is used. But intelligence on Iraq’s capabilities and
intentions in this
field is
limited.”
311.
The JIC also
judged that:
•
Saddam’s
“capability to conduct effective terrorist attacks” was “very
limited”.
•
Iraq’s
“terrorism capability” was “inadequate to carry out chemical or
biological
attacks
beyond individual assassination attempts using
poisons”.
312.
The JIC
Assessment of 29 January 2003 sustained its earlier judgements
on Iraq’s
ability and
intent to conduct terrorist operations.150
313.
Sir David
Omand, the Security and Intelligence Co-ordinator in the Cabinet
Office
from 2002
to 2005, told the Inquiry that, in March 2002, the Security Service
judged that
the “threat
from terrorism from Saddam’s own intelligence apparatus in the
event of an
intervention
in Iraq … was judged to be limited and
containable”.151
314.
Baroness
Manningham-Buller, the Director General of the Security Service
from
2002 to
2007, confirmed that position, stating that the Security Service
felt there was
“a pretty
good intelligence picture of a threat from Iraq within the UK and
to British
315.
Baroness
Manningham-Buller added that subsequent events showed
the
judgement
that Saddam Hussein did not have the capability to do anything
much
in the UK,
had “turned out to be the right judgement”.153
316.
While it
was reasonable for the Government to be concerned about
the
fusion of
proliferation and terrorism, there was no basis in the JIC
Assessments
to suggest
that Iraq itself represented such a threat.
148
Private
hearing, 16 June 2010, pages 39-40.
149
JIC
Assessment, 10 October 2002, ‘International Terrorism: The
Threat from Iraq’.
150
JIC
Assessment, 29 January 2003, ‘Iraq: The Emerging view from
Baghdad’.
151
Public
hearing, 20 January 2010, page 37.
152
Public
hearing, 20 July 2010, page 6.
153
Public
hearing, 20 July 2010, page 9.
611