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7  |  Conclusions: Pre-conflict strategy and planning
to Iraq … [I] think, one could say this is one of his primary national security concerns
given the nature of Al Qaida.”148
309.  The JIC assessed that Iraq was likely to mount a terrorist attack only in
response to military action and if the existence of the regime was threatened.
310.  The JIC Assessment of 10 October 2002 stated that Saddam Hussein’s “overriding
objective” was to “avoid a US attack that would threaten his regime”.149 The JIC judged
that, in the event of US-led military action against Iraq, Saddam would:
“… aim to use terrorism or the threat of it. Fearing the US response, he is likely to
weigh the costs and benefits carefully in deciding the timing and circumstances in
which terrorism is used. But intelligence on Iraq’s capabilities and intentions in this
field is limited.”
311.  The JIC also judged that:
Saddam’s “capability to conduct effective terrorist attacks” was “very limited”.
Iraq’s “terrorism capability” was “inadequate to carry out chemical or biological
attacks beyond individual assassination attempts using poisons”.
312.  The JIC Assessment of 29 January 2003 sustained its earlier judgements on Iraq’s
ability and intent to conduct terrorist operations.150
313.  Sir David Omand, the Security and Intelligence Co-ordinator in the Cabinet Office
from 2002 to 2005, told the Inquiry that, in March 2002, the Security Service judged that
the “threat from terrorism from Saddam’s own intelligence apparatus in the event of an
intervention in Iraq … was judged to be limited and containable”.151
314.  Baroness Manningham-Buller, the Director General of the Security Service from
2002 to 2007, confirmed that position, stating that the Security Service felt there was
“a pretty good intelligence picture of a threat from Iraq within the UK and to British
interests”.152
315.  Baroness Manningham-Buller added that subsequent events showed the
judgement that Saddam Hussein did not have the capability to do anything much
in the UK, had “turned out to be the right judgement”.153
316.  While it was reasonable for the Government to be concerned about the
fusion of proliferation and terrorism, there was no basis in the JIC Assessments
to suggest that Iraq itself represented such a threat.
148 Private hearing, 16 June 2010, pages 39-40.
149 JIC Assessment, 10 October 2002, ‘International Terrorism: The Threat from Iraq’.
150 JIC Assessment, 29 January 2003, ‘Iraq: The Emerging view from Baghdad’.
151 Public hearing, 20 January 2010, page 37.
152 Public hearing, 20 July 2010, page 6.
153 Public hearing, 20 July 2010, page 9.
611
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