12.1 |
Security Sector Reform
A Report to
Congress on 29 August 2006 stated that “more than 160” Police
Transition
Teams
(PTTs) were helping to develop the IPS.822
International
Police Liaison Officers
(IPLOs)
were integrated into PTTs, providing expertise in all technical
aspects of criminal
investigation
and police station management. The Report stated that an additional
five
(US)
Military Police companies were deployed in July 2006 to bolster the
PTT programme.
The next
Report on 30 November stated there were 177 PTTs, each team
with
11‑15 members:
three or four IPLOs, hired as contractors from US State Department
and
the rest
typically military personnel (often Military
Police).823
A Report to
Congress on 2 March 2007 stated that there were a total of
around
6,000 international
advisers in more than 450 Transition Teams.824
The
Transition Teams
were
established in the following proportions:
•
200 Police
Transition Teams;
•
40 National
Police Transition Teams;
•
30 Border
Transition Teams;
•
170 Military
Transition Teams; and
•
Transition
Teams in various ministries and command establishments
including
the MOI,
IMOD and the JHQ.825
Even with
the extra personnel, shortages of PTTs were limiting observation of
the IPS in
13 of the
18 provinces, including Basra and Maysan.826
The DoD’s
Report to Congress in
March 2007
cited cost and risk to personnel as the reasons for limited
coverage.827
858.
In his weekly
update on 2 February 2005, Maj Gen Riley
wrote:
“IPS reform
is a problem wider and deeper than the Army, and the incoming
Chief
Police
Adviser will be key to turning them into an effective counter
insurgency force
… there is
a proposal to send the new Chief Police Adviser to Baghdad instead
of
here … I
would advise against this in the strongest possible terms: this
will lead to
a delay of
months (probably) in police reform here, months that we do not
need. UK
can have
the greatest effect here on the ground …”828
859.
On 17 March,
Lt Gen Fry produced a paper for the Chiefs of Staff
examining
the
consequences of “the UK’s MND(SE)‑centric strategy” and the
likelihood that ISF
development
in MND(SE) would progress faster than elsewhere in
Iraq.829
The
Chiefs
822
Report to
Congress, 29 August 2006, Measuring
Stability and Security in Iraq.
823
Report to
Congress, 30 November 2006, Measuring
Stability and Security in Iraq.
824
Report to
Congress, 2 March 2007, Measuring
Stability and Security in Iraq.
825
These are
approximate figures, estimated by the Inquiry based on available
data.
826
Report to
Congress, 29 August 2006, Measuring
Stability and Security in Iraq.
827
Report to
Congress, 2 March 2007, Measuring
Stability and Security in Iraq.
828
Report
Riley, 2 February 2005, ‘CG MND(SE) – Southern Iraq Update – 2
February 2005’.
829
Minute
DCDS(C) to COS, 17 March 2005, ‘Iraq – Strategic Consequences for
UK of Iraqi Self Reliance’.
251