The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
290.
Mr Blair
replied “? why not? – sounds right to me except possibly it may
be
possible to
get a middle ground resolution.”97
291.
The FCO
advice to No.10 on 4 September reflected Sir Jeremy’s view
that
it would be
difficult to negotiate any resolution which implicitly or
explicitly
authorised
the use of force without clear Iraqi provocation to provide a
“trigger”.
292.
Mr Straw’s
Private Office sent advice to No.10 on 4 September on a
“wider
range of
possible UNSCRs and a game‑plan for securing them”, drawing
attention
to Sir Jeremy
Greenstock’s advice in his letter of 3 September.98
The letter
to
Sir David Manning
made clear that Mr Straw had not seen the advice.
293.
The FCO set
out three possible approaches, but made no
recommendation.
First, a
resolution specifically authorising the use of force:
affirming
that Iraq had
“ignored”
the UN’s demands and failed to comply with relevant resolutions;
confirming
that Iraq’s
behaviour, and in particular its possession of WMD, “constituted a
threat to
international
peace and security”; and authorising a “coalition of the willing to
take ‘all
necessary
measures’ to ensure Iraq’s compliance with the UN’s
demands”.
294.
Such a
resolution would “provide an unambiguous justification for the use
of force”
but it
would be “immensely difficult to negotiate” and the prospects would
improve “only
if there
were a recent and flagrant example of Iraqi
non‑compliance”.
295.
Secondly,
a resolution
determining that Iraq’s failure to co‑operate with
“UNMOVIC
etc” constituted a flagrant violation or material breach of
previous
resolutions:
with a call
for Iraq to co‑operate fully and possibly a timed
ultimatum
“though the
warning to Iraq would be implicit without it”.
296.
In the FCO
view “such a resolution could be argued to provide sufficient
grounds
for the use
of force … on the [grounds] that it revived the authorisation … in
[resolution]
687”. That
would “undoubtedly be easier for some UNSC members to support than
one
which
explicitly authorised all necessary measures, although many would
recognise it for
what it is,
and take up positions accordingly”.
297.
Thirdly,
a resolution
calling for re‑admission of inspectors with a tight
timetable,
more intrusive powers etc: re‑affirming
Security Council support for
UNMOVIC and
the IAEA and for disarming Iraq of WMD with a tight timetable
for
compliance
and UNMOVIC reports and a commitment to take action if
UNMOVIC
reported
Iraq was not co‑operating.
97
Manuscript
comment Blair, [undated], on Letter
Greenstock
to Jay, 3 September 2002, ‘Iraq: Handling in
the
Security Council’.
98
Letter
Sedwill to Manning, 4 September 2002, ‘Iraq’ attaching Paper ‘Iraq:
UNSC Action’.
146