The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
inputs”.
That longer-term presence would be considered in a strategy review
scheduled
for October
2003.
335.
The Interim
Strategy stated that DFID had earmarked £210m for “relief,
recovery
and
reconstruction activities” during 2003/04.188
336.
Drawing on
figures provided by DFID, the Inquiry calculates that DFID
committed
£117.8m to
the humanitarian relief effort in the period up to May 2003, of
which £89m
had been
disbursed:
•
£78m to UN
agencies (£64m disbursed);
•
£32m to the
ICRC and the Iraqi Red Crescent (£18m disbursed);
•
£6.2m to
NGOs (£5.4m disbursed); and
•
£1.6m for
DFID’s bilateral effort (all disbursed).189
337.
Approximately
£90m therefore remained available for “recovery and
reconstruction”
and further
contributions to the humanitarian relief effort.
338.
The Inquiry
has seen no indication of any assessment of whether that
budget
for
recovery and reconstruction was sufficient to achieve the UK’s
aspirations and
objectives.
339.
US funding for
reconstruction was of a different magnitude.
340.
In April 2003,
the US Congress approved US$2.4bn for the newly created
Iraq
Relief and
Reconstruction Fund (IRRF1), to pay for “humanitarian assistance”
and
“rehabilitation
and reconstruction in Iraq”.190
341.
Over 70
percent of the fund (US$1.82bn) was allocated to USAID. By early
May,
USAID had
awarded US$1.5bn in contracts for projects to restore
infrastructure and
support
initiatives for health, education, agriculture and economic reform.
The largest
contract,
worth US$680m, was secured by Bechtel to restore
infrastructure.
342.
In early May,
the UK Government became increasingly concerned about the
scale
of the
reconstruction challenge and the adequacy of the ORHA response,
particularly in
the
South.
188
Letter
Bewes to Rycroft, 2 May 2003, ‘Iraq Rehabilitation’ attaching Paper
DFID, [undated],
‘Iraq:
Interim DFID Strategy’.
189
Letter Amos
to Boateng, 10 September 2003, ‘Iraq Reconstruction Funding:
Reserve Claim’;
Paper DFID,
4 November 2009, ‘Iraq – DFID Timeline and Financial Commitments:
2003-2009’.
190
Bowen SW
Jr. Hard
Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience. U.S.
Government Printing
Office,
2009.
62