The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
and – GOC
and a few other boys down there in Basra”.332
He
recounted having warned
Maj Gen
Shaw that “if you take one step ahead of the Iraqi Government, the
answer is
this is
absolutely doomed”.
634.
ACM Stirrup
visited Iraq from 25 to 27 February, beginning in Basra and
then
moving
north to Baghdad.333
A report of
the visit written by Lt Col Richmond, his
Military
Adviser, said that Gen Petraeus “thought that MNF could establish a
secure
environment”
and had said that PIC would continue, though “not necessarily to
the
previously
declared timetable (all provinces by Nov 07)”. Lt Gen Odierno was
judged
to be
“very on side with what the UK was doing in SE Iraq”.
635.
Lt Col
Richmond observed:
“It was
striking how the high threat environment was taking its toll on
people.
It was no
longer possible to return off patrol to relax and unwind in camp
due
to the IDF
threat.”
636.
Mr Robert
Gibson, British Deputy Head of Mission Washington, was
reported
to have
briefed ACM Stirrup that “whilst Washington was happy with the
PM’s
announcement
on UK re‑posturing, the US Embassy in Baghdad was not and
he
had been
given a hard time.”
637.
In response to
concerns raised by Maj Gen Shaw, ACM Stirrup:
“… outlined
how the strategic benefits of vacating Basra Palace (BP) outweighed
the
tactical
benefits of remaining. He had not been willing to agree to remain
in BP until
further
notice and the date of Aug was driven by the timeline for
repositioning all the
capabilities
… The situation in the city would never be good enough, therefore
there
was risk –
but it was better to take risk whilst we had the force elements and
before
PIC as we
would still be able to intervene when we wished.”
638.
On 26
February, Mrs Beckett’s Private Secretary wrote to Mr Blair’s
Private
Secretary
for Foreign Affairs to say that since December the US had been
signalling
their
intention to counter Iranian‑supported attacks.334
639.
The FCO judged
that an aggressive operation could fuel perceptions that
the
US was
seeking military confrontation with Iran on a broader front. The UK
was more
vulnerable
to Iranian retaliation than the US, because it maintained an
Embassy in
Tehran and
because of Iran’s ability to make trouble in Basra and Maysan. Any
UK
involvement
in the US‑led initiative would require careful consideration of the
rules of
engagement
for UK troops.
332
Private
hearing, 24 May 2010, page 88.
333
Minute
Richmond to PSSC/SofS [MOD], 5 March 2007, ‘CDS Visit to Iraq 25‑27
Feb 07’.
334
Letter
Siddiq to Fletcher, 26 February 2007, ‘Iraq: Countering Iranian
Activity’ attaching Paper IPU,
19 February
2007, ‘Iraq: Countering Iranian Activity’.
118