The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

157.  Maj Gen Brims provided a written update to the Chiefs of Staff on the Forces and

Resources Review on 2 September.75 He wrote:

“The deployment of protected mobility is key to improving the FP [force protection]

available to soldiers and to enabling the posture of the force to be changed to meet

emerging threats. The initial assessment is that a minimum of 228 vehicles will

be required – further detailed work is still needed to identify the most appropriate

platform from those that have been identified as being available and it may be that

an ‘in‑service’ quick fix is required using NI [Northern Ireland] and pool assets.”

158.  The Review was discussed by the Chiefs of Staff on 3 September.76 General

Sir Michael Walker, Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS), directed that the request for

additional Snatch vehicles should be met by drawing from the Northern Ireland reserve

battalions in the first instance.

159.  On 4 September, Mr Hoon’s Private Office sent a letter to No.10 setting out the

outcome of the Forces and Resources Review.77 It stated that roughly 1,200 servicemen

and women were being deployed; an “early increase of 12 percent to the UK forces

currently in theatre”. The extra personnel would be supported by the “deployment of a

quantity of armoured patrol vehicles, some of which will be drawn from Northern Ireland”.

That would have “a limited, but manageable effect” on the UK’s ability to “conduct

current operations in support of the PSNI [Police Service of Northern Ireland]”.

160.  On 5 September, a further meeting of the PPV Working Group was held “to

develop a list of issues and associated options to meet the perceived requirement for

the future deployment of PPV in support of Op TELIC”.78

161.  The record of the meeting stated that the “initial verbal request” was for

228 vehicles for delivery to Iraq within two weeks, as per the Forces and Resources

Review. All representatives present at the meeting agreed that was an “unrealistic”

timetable. A DEC(SP) representative set out a phased approach to meeting the

requirement, the final phase being that enough vehicles were provided for two brigades.

162.  Whilst there was currently no SOR, information provided from theatre indicated

a requirement “closely aligned to those for the Tavern/Snatch vehicles currently in use

in Northern Ireland”. A footnote stated:

“Due to the limited Tavern fleet and the expected high cost of procuring similar

vehicles, the PPV protection requirement must be realistic in order to permit a timely

and cost effective solution to the UOR.”

75  Minute SECCOS to PSO/CDS, 1 September 2003, ‘OP COS paper: Op TELIC – UK Force and

Resources Review An Update’ attaching Minute Brims, 2 September 2003, ‘Op TELIC – UK Force and

Resources Review – An Update’.

76  Minutes, 3 September 2003, Chiefs of Staff meeting.

77  Letter Williams to Rycroft, 4 September 2003, ‘Iraq: UK Forces and Resources Review’.

78  Minutes, 5 September 2003, ‘Protected Patrol Vehicle (PPV) Workshop Group Friday 5 September 2003

– Minutes’.

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