The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

143.  In an exchange of correspondence with Dr Blix, which followed Iraq’s admission,

the IAEA disputed Iraq’s view that it had not violated its obligations.56

144.  Iraq continued to contest the IAEA view.57 It stated that:

• Research activities had not reached the stage which required notification.

• The amount of enriched uranium produced was far less that the defined

threshold for notification of 75 kilogrammes.

• It had experimented on only a “single centrifuge prototype, and not a successive

chain”.

• The three enrichment methods were in the early stages of development and did

not mean the existence of an installation.

• Iraq was not required to report holdings of yellowcake and uranium dioxide

which were being used for non-nuclear purposes, including reinforcing anti-tank

warheads.

• IAEA inspectors had had access to stores of such material alongside material

they were verifying and had pointed out that yellowcake was not subject to

inspection.

145.  On 11 July, the JIC addressed Iraq’s nuclear activities.58

146.  The JIC reported that, on the basis of post-war intelligence, it now knew that:

“… in the 1980s Iraq investigated four methods of uranium enrichment, including the

use of centrifuges. But the route that had made most progress was electromagnetic

isotope separation (EMIS).”

147.  The JIC noted there was intelligence that “enough fissile material had been

produced before the coalition air attacks to produce one nuclear device”; but it

concluded that, whilst the intelligence was generally credible, it did not believe that Iraq

could have obtained enough fissile material for a bomb through the route described in

the intelligence. The JIC added:

“Nonetheless, given our lack of intelligence about the Iraqi nuclear programme, we

cannot exclude the possibility that Iraq might have produced more fissile material

than we have previously believed.”

56  International Atomic Energy Agency, 9 July 1991, ‘Letter dated 9 July 1991 from the Director General to

the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq’ (GOV/2530 Annex 2); International Atomic Energy Agency, 11 July

1991, ‘Letter dated 11 July 1991 from the Director General to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq’

(GOV/2530 Annex 3).

57  International Atomic Energy Agency, 10 July 1991, ‘Letter dated 10 July 1991 from the Minister for

Foreign Affairs of Iraq to the Director General’ (GOV/2530 Annex 4); International Atomic Energy Agency,

12 July 1991, ‘Letter dated 12 July 1991 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq to the Director

General’ (GOV/2530 Annex 5).

58  Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction [“The Butler Report”], 14 July 2004, HC 898,

page 44.

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