4.4 | The
search for WMD
631.
In late
January, officials advised Mr Blair that there was “a clear
risk” that
President
Bush would set up an inquiry into Iraq intelligence before he was
forced
to do so by
Congress.
632.
Sir Nigel
Sheinwald discussed the mounting pressure for inquiries in the
UK
and the
US with Dr Rice on 29 January.348
He
recommended that No.10 and the
White House
stay “in the closest touch” to ensure public lines were
co-ordinated.
633.
Sir Nigel told
Mr Straw’s office that the US Administration would prefer to
make an
announcement
itself rather than be pushed into one by Congress or the media. It
was
clear that
something was “stirring” in Washington. The announcement of an
inquiry there
would make
it very difficult to hold the line in the UK.
634.
Mr Powell
sent a copy of Sir Nigel’s letter to Mr Blair with the
advice:
“You must
decide on this with Bush on Tuesday [3 February] before
the
[Parliamentary]
debate on Wednesday.”349
635.
In a minute to
Sir Nigel Sheinwald on 30 January, Mr Scarlett set out
his
understanding
of developments in the US, including concern about a “Notification
to
Congress
that one piece of intelligence underpinning” Secretary Powell’s
presentation to
the UN on
5 February 2003 “came from an unreliable source”, and that CIA
analysts had
missed a
“fabrication warning”.350
636.
Mr Scarlett
commented:
“This
discredited report was sent to SIS but not issued by them so it
was not
reflected
in our classified assessments or in the dossier. There is one
reference in
the dossier
(the Executive Summary) to mobile ‘laboratories’. This was a
general
term to
cover mobile facilities and was not meant to be distinct from
‘production’
units. In
terms of any press lines it will be sufficient to say that the
discredited report
was not
issued by SIS.”
“The ground
is audibly shifting in Washington. There is a clear risk that
the
Administration
will set up an Inquiry into the Iraq intelligence. This will take
many
months to
report and push the whole issue beyond November. It might have the
side
effect of
prompting an early winding up of the ISG.”
348
Letter
Sheinwald to Adams, 30 January 2004, ‘Conversation with US
National Security Adviser’.
349
Manuscript
comment Powell to PM on Letter Sheinwald to Adams, 30 January
2004, ‘Conversation with
US National
Security Adviser’.
350
Minute
Scarlett to Sheinwald, 30 January 2004, ‘Iraq WMD: Update from
CIA’.
549