6.1 | Development of the military options for an invasion of Iraq

654. In response to the minute which Mr Drummond had classified “Confidential”,

Sir David Manning commented: “Please ensure all minuting is Secret and Personal –

and keep circulation to [the] barest minimum.”266

655. Although significant concerns were identified about the viability of an

operation through Turkey, the northern option remained the preference of the

Chiefs of Staff.

656. Military planners also advised that deployment of anything above a small

scale land force would commit the UK to three medium scale operations.

657. In the event of the deployment of UK land forces, there was a judgement

to be made on whether the UK military should be engaged in the conflict or

post‑conflict phase. Both would be difficult to sustain.

658. Adm Boyce noted that it was “inconceivable” that the UK military would not

contribute “in some manner” to post‑conflict tasks.

659. A commentary on the military options, seeking judgements and decisions from

the Chiefs of Staff to inform Ministerial decisions, was prepared by the SPG on

19 September.267

660. The SPG reported that US military planners and the Joint Staff in Washington had

made it clear that the UN process would “not derail their current planning timelines”

although it was clear that “political developments may yet overtake the military’s

contingency work”.

661. The SPG identified continuing uncertainties in the potential shape and timing of

a campaign and the Chiefs of Staff view was that it was not “yet” a winning concept:

• The northern option was not yet “firmly established as a viable axis” because

of uncertainties about Turkey and the logistic feasibility of the operation. The

Chiefs of Staff would “wish to assess whether there is yet sufficient operational

emphasis being place upon it for the UK to commit forces”.

• The [US] timelines determining UK “deadlines” were based on offering

President Bush “the earliest opportunity for action, as opposed to ‘the last safe

moment’ for a decision”.

• There was no clear articulation of post‑conflict scenarios and their demands.

• The UN track might “delay rather than advance decisions on the legality of any

potential action”.

266 Manuscript comment Manning on Minute Drummond to Manning, 16 September 2002, ‘Iraq:

Pigott Meeting’.

267 Paper SPG, 19 September 2002, ‘Iraq Package Options – Military Strategy Commentary’.

273