6.2 | Military planning for the invasion, January to March 2003

65. The SPG concluded:

“UK is at a strategic decision point … given the convergence of US military

preparation and timelines, continued Turkish prevarication, and the need to maintain

pressure on the Iraqi regime to deliver …

“From a review of all the factors the downside military risk of UK disengaging from

the Northern Land Option is outweighed by the upside benefits of the proposed

engagement in the South.”

66. The SPG recommended that the Chiefs of Staff should agree Lt Gen Reith’s

recommendation for a force package to be deployed to the South.

67. Adm Boyce directed that Ministerial approval should be sought for

Lt Gen Reith’s recommended option while noting that a formal request from the

US would be needed.

68. At their meeting on 8 January, the Chiefs of Staff noted that there was still a need

for the US formally to request that any UK ground forces be switched to the South.14

69. Adm Boyce also observed that it was “inconceivable that the UK would not play

a part in Phase IV operations, which could be enduring”. He added:

“There remained a need to test the plan as a winning concept, but against that

caveat … the plan recommended in the paper represented a sensible military option

with a valuable task, and that the option should be taken forward.”

70. Other points made in the discussion included:

• “The shift in focus from North to South argued for the provision of a

comprehensive force package able to react to a wide range of tasks …”

• “The plan was operationally sound but there were strategic implications that

would have to be considered. It was possible that UK forces would become a

lynchpin for the US campaign. This could place the UK in a difficult position …

conversely, the strategic influence it would offer the UK would be significant.”

71. The Chiefs of Staff agreed Lt Gen Reith’s recommendations and selected the option

of deploying the Divisional HQ and three brigades. Ministerial approval would be sought

in two stages:

• a submission seeking approval to make the necessary forces available and

to deploy certain enabling elements; and

• a further approval to deploy the main force and to release 16 Air Assault Brigade

from Op FRESCO.

14 Minutes, 8 January 2003, Chiefs of Staff meeting.

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