The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
He also
described meeting the families of those who died in the conflict as
one of the
Inquiry’s
first priorities.
469.
Mr Forber
advised Mr Hutton’s Private Secretary on the way ahead for the
defence
agreement
on 31 July.191
In addition
to the two options put forward by Mr Wilks, he
identified
a third:
“The
Government of Iraq and NATO agree that the UK maritime training
activity
should in
future come under the NATO mission.”
470.
Mr Forber
assessed that this option would:
“… not
allow for protection of Iraqi oil platforms/territorial waters, it
would meet all
our
requirements for training of the Iraqi navy including
jurisdictional immunities –
the NATO
agreement has slightly better immunities than the UK agreement as
we
ensured it
explicitly included Umm Qasr as a potential location to cover just
such
an eventuality.”
471.
On 31 July,
Mr McDonald called Prime Minister Maliki’s Chief of Staff to
press for
rapid
progress on an interim agreement.192
He observed
that “UK media was portraying
this as a
problem in our bilateral relationship”. Prime Minister Maliki’s
Chief of Staff said
that the
Iraq Government would “continue to work on trying to find
appropriate ways
forward”.
472.
On 5 August,
the JIC again considered Iranian influence in Iraq, and Iraq’s
reaction
“Iraq can
stand up to Iranian political interference and will begin to reject
it as
it
exercises its sovereignty with increasing confidence. Iraq can also
withstand
Iranian
military interference through its strategic defence agreement with
the US,
improvement
of its armed forces and political accommodation with the Shia
militants
that Iran
supports …
“In the
longer term, Iran’s increasing trade and investment are laying the
foundations
for ‘soft
power’ by establishing dependency in areas where Iraqi and
Iranian
interests
coincide. The planned withdrawal of large numbers of US forces in
2011
will be a
particularly testing time for the Iraqi Government and armed forces
…
“Iraqis,
even most Shia, consider Iran to be their biggest strategic threat,
but many
also see
Iranian money and investment as an opportunity for personal gain
and
national
economic well-being. Friction between the two countries is
inevitable, but
191
Minute
Forber to PS/Secretary of State [MOD], 31 July 2009, ‘Iraq: UK
Defence Agreement’.
192
Email Wilks
to [various], 31 July 2009, ‘Iraq: Security Agreement and Hostages:
Simon McDonald
call on
Tariq Abdallah, Maliki’s CoS’.
193
JIC
Assessment, 5 August 2009, ‘Can Iraq Stand Up to
Iran?’
462