The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
1375.
In March and
April, British forces withdrew from a number of bases in Basra
City,
handing
them over to 10th Division:
•
the Old
State Building on 20 March;1259
•
the Shatt
al‑Arab Hotel on 8 April; and1260
•
Shaibah
Logistics Base on 24 April.1261
1376.
A JIC
Assessment on 25 April considered the prospects for transition in
the
“Increased
security efforts in Basra between September 2006 and March
2007
(Operation
SINBAD) had some local effect in disrupting militia activity and
improving
public
confidence … Sectarian and other murders have fallen from some 100
a
month in
mid‑2006 to 30 in March 2007 … Other forms of violence,
criminality, and
intimidation
– much of which we judge goes unreported – remain
widespread.
“MND(SE)
assess that ISF in Basra now meet the minimum criteria for
transitional
readiness.
Slow improvement in the army continues: 1 Brigade in Basra
took
the lead in
the latter stages of Operation SINBAD and performed well, within
the
limitations
of their capability. Much more serious problems persist in the
local police
[…] 61
arrest warrants against SCU officers remain outstanding, despite
coalition
pressure. A
weight of reporting shows that police effectiveness in Basra is
still
severely
compromised by corruption, poor leadership and the entrenched
influence
of Shia
militias. Some policemen are actively assisting JAM attacks on
MNF.
“We judge
that as the scale of MNF presence reduces, violence between rival
Shia
political
parties, backed by their militias, is likely to intensify. Most see
PIC as an
opportunity
to extend their own power base in political and security
structures, and
increase
control over economic resources …
“The nature
and scale of any conflict will be determined partly by events in
Baghdad
and Najaf,
particularly the ability of the United Iraqi Alliance to stick
together and
assert
authority over its provincial supporters … In the absence of an
effective
political
brake on serious intra‑Shia fighting, we judge that the ISF would
not be
able to
cope; the police would probably fragment and the army would try to
avoid
direct
confrontation, while seeking to contain the
situation.”
1259
Minute Shaw
to CJO, 21 March 2007, ‘GOC MND(SE) – Southern Iraq Update – 21
March 2007’.
1260
Minute GOC
MND(SE) to CJO, 12 April 2007, ‘COS HQ MND(SE) – Southern Iraq
Update –
12 April
2007’.
1261
Minute Shaw
to CJO, 24 April 2007, ‘GOC HQ MND(SE) – Southern Iraq Update – 24
April 2007’.
1262
JIC
Assessment, 25 April 2007, ‘Iraq: Prospects for Transition in the
South’.
374