3.4 |
Development of UK strategy and options, late July to 14 September
2002
were
preliminary thoughts … you [Mr Blair] would want to explore
the pros and
cons of an
ultimatum, and its timing, when you saw [President] Bush
tomorrow.”
323.
Dr Rice
did not contest Sir David’s points. She told him that “the
current plan” was
for
President Bush’s speech at the UN General Assembly to “focus on a
clear demand
that Iraq
must forswear WMD” which would be “accompanied by an announcement”
that
the US
would be tabling a draft resolution.
324.
Sir David
reported that current White House thinking on the core points for
the
resolution
included:
•
full “WMD
disarmament under the international supervision of the
Security
Council”;
•
“unrestricted
access for UNMOVIC”;
•
freedom for
“witnesses” to the WMD programme to leave Iraq and be
interviewed
by UNMOVIC “at any time”;
•
empowerment
for inspectors “to destroy any prohibited material
they
discovered”;
•
“force
protection” for UNMOVIC; and
•
Iraqi
agreement to no‑fly and no‑drive zones as required.
The
resolution would conclude by stating that If Saddam Hussein
“adhered to these
conditions”,
that would “lead to a new international relationship with
Iraq”.
325.
Sir David
told Dr Rice that force protection would be “a hard sell”. He
had repeated
the need to
have some “negotiating fat” in the draft resolution for Russia,
which might
include
force protection. Dr Rice agreed.
326.
Sir David
reported that he had “welcomed the fact” that the US was “not
now
thinking of
stipulating regime change”. Dr Rice said that as they “had
discussed before,
Saddam’s
acceptance of the other conditions would lead to a radically
different regime
anyway”.
Sir David also said that there was a need to find a way to
emphasise that the
“quarrel
was with Saddam not the Iraqi people”; the “aim should be to
isolate him, as we
had tried
to isolate Milošević”. Dr Rice agreed.
327.
Sir David
reported to Mr Blair:
“As I said
to you afterwards, further encouragement. White House thinking
about the
contents of
the resolution has come back to earth and looks broadly plausible.
And
their view
of handling (a serious text, working with Putin etc) seems close to
ours.
We must
hope all this survives Cheney and the NSC meeting starting this
evening.
But on this
evidence, the Administration may now be ready to make a genuine
effort
to go the
UN route. Cementing this at Camp David will be a real
prize.”106
106
Minute
Manning to Prime Minister, 6 September 2002, ‘Iraq: Conversation
with Condi Rice’.
151