10.1 |
Reconstruction: March 2003 to June 2004
91.
On 27 March,
the British Embassy Washington reported that the US had
invited
representatives
of around 47 Embassies to attend an inter-agency briefing
intended
to generate
military and civilian contributions to Phase IV.67
The Embassy
commented:
“Given that
we have been thinking ourselves about an exercise to generate
support
for the UK
sector in Phase IV, we will need to make sure that we deconflict
this from
the US
effort.”
92.
The Embassy
also commented that this was separate from the US
initiative
to convene
a small core group of countries to manage Iraq’s humanitarian
and
reconstruction
needs. The UK, Spain, Australia, Japan and possibly a Gulf
State
would be
approached to participate in the group.
93.
Mr Peter
Watkins, Mr Hoon’s Principal Private Secretary, advised
Mr Lee on
28 March
that Mr Hoon agreed that “given the likely scale of the Phase
IV task, there
are good
practical as well as political reasons to engage early with
potential partners”
and that
Mr Hoon had, after discussion with Sir Kevin Tebbit, MOD
Permanent Under
Secretary
(PUS), written to the Defence Ministers of the “most willing”
countries.68
94.
On the same
day, Mr Hoon informed the Ad Hoc Meeting on Iraq that he had
written
to selected
Defence Ministers asking them to consider a military contribution
to the
95.
On 1 April,
the Cabinet Office reported that, during the core group’s first
conference
call, the
UK, Spain, Australia and Japan had suggested that “reconstruction
must go
through the
UN, with an early new UNSCR [resolution] and the IFIs
engaged”.70
96.
On 10 April,
the FCO issued instructions to overseas posts to seek
military
contributions
from host governments to support Phase IV in the UK sector of
Iraq.71
The FCO
stated that the UK hoped to be able to reduce its military
deployment by
two‑thirds
during Phase IV, but advised posts to:
“… base
your approaches on the need for widespread international support
for
consolidating
security and stability and getting Iraq back on its feet, which
should be
a more
powerful argument for potential contributors than offsetting the
effects of a
UK
drawdown.
“We intend
to continue to provide a discrete self-supporting military
capability in
the UK area
of operation, allowing maximum flexibility to cope with whatever
role
we assume
in Phase IV. From about September … [w]e will be able to provide
the
67
Telegram
397 Washington to FCO London, 27 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Phase IV: US
Coalition Building’.
68
Minute
Watkins to DG Op Pol, 28 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Coalition-building for
Phase IV’.
69
Minutes, 28
March 2003, Ad Hoc Meeting on Iraq.
70
Report
Cabinet Office, 1 April 2003, ‘Iraq: Evening Round-Up 1
April’.
71
Telegram 33
FCO London to Rome, 10 April 2003, ‘Phase IV Military
Contributions: Lobbying
Instructions’.
19