The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
183.
The JIC
commissioned an Assessment of “Saddam’s threat perceptions
and
internal
position: whether he is secure, what opposition he faces and what
he is doing to
try and
avoid the internal and international threats he
faces”.91
184.
In its
discussion of the draft, the JIC decided that the final
Assessment:
“… needed
to say a bit more about Iraq’s aspirations and potential in terms
of
Weapons of
Mass Destruction, not least because this was, and would remain,
an
important
area for policy discussions with the US. The Pentagon’s views on
how
soon Iraq
might develop a nuclear capability did not quite match the UK’s,
and it
would be
useful for Ministers to know the JIC’s mind.”92
185.
The
Assessment, issued on 27 February, is addressed in detail in
Section 3.2.
186.
In relation to
Iraq’s WMD, a Key Judgement stated that Iraq
continued:
“… to
pursue its WMD programmes. Design work for missiles with ranges
greater
than the UN
limit of 150km was under way. If it has not already done so, Iraq
could
produce
significant quantities of biological warfare agent within days and
chemical
warfare
agents within weeks of a decision to do so.”93
187.
In relation to
Iraq’s WMD capabilities, the Assessment stated:
“… Iraq
continues to pursue the development of weapons of mass
destruction.
“Though we
lack precise data, Iraq has probably reconstituted many of the
elements
struck
during Operation Desert Fox in December 1998.
“Iraq’s
ballistic missile programme has extensively tested missiles under
the
150km UN
limit and intelligence indicates that design work for systems with
ranges
over
1,000km is under way.
“Iraq is
assessed to have hidden 10-20 Al Hussein missiles (range 650km)
capable
of hitting
Israel.
“Iraq also
continues with its chemical and biological warfare (CBW)
programmes
and, if it
has not already done so, could produce significant quantities of
BW
agent
within days and CW agents within weeks of a decision to do so.
These can
be
delivered by a variety of means. Methods of ensuring survivability
of CBW
production
facilities from attack are a high priority.
“Procurement
activity suggests that Iraq is continuing with a nuclear
weapons
programme,
although its current status is unclear.
91
JIC
Assessment, 27 February 2002, ‘Iraq: Saddam Under the
Spotlight’.
92
Minutes, 27
February 2002, JIC meeting.
93
JIC
Assessment, 27 February 2002, ‘Iraq: Saddam Under the
Spotlight’.
48