The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
1043.
Since 3
March, No.10 and the FCO had been discussing how to use
the
UNMOVIC
“clusters” document to the UK’s advantage.
1044.
Officials
recognised that the document was largely historical and a
list
of things
Iraq should have done; UNMOVIC was not due to present its
analysis
of “Key
Disarmament Tasks” required by resolution 1284 to the Security
Council
until 27
March. The document was described as a “167 page-long
catalogue
of Iraqi
intransigence”.
1045.
At No.10’s
request, the FCO analysis of the document was sent to
all
Cabinet
Ministers on 6 March.
1046.
Mr Rycroft
advised Mr Blair on 4 March:
“Our best
guess is that … we have a reasonable chance of securing ten
positive
votes … But
we are also faced with an increasingly likely French
veto.
“To
increase the chances of securing nine or ten votes, we should take
on board
Chilean/Mexican
concerns.”329
1047.
Mr Rycroft
identified Chile and Mexico as the least likely of the 10
possible
positive
votes. He set out options identified by Sir Jeremy Greenstock, of
which “the
most
promising” was “a combination of an ultimatum and
benchmarks”.
1048.
Setting out a
spectrum of options for the language of an ultimatum setting
out
actions
Iraq would need to have taken “by [17 March]”, Mr Rycroft
wrote:
“There are
mixed signs as to whether the US would accept any of these
approaches.
But our
instinct is to press on hard, and to try to persuade the
Chileans/Mexicans
themselves
to table this amendment, after Blix’s 7 March report.”
“In
parallel … but outside the resolution, we should set out what we
mean by full
compliance
by picking out benchmarks based on Blix’s clusters document …
[I]f
we end
up with ultimatum language at the soft end of the spectrum, we
shall need
to say
what we mean [by the language of the resolution] …”
1050.
Mr Rycroft
advised:
“There is
no guarantee that these moves would help prevent a French veto. But
they
should help
ensure a Russian abstention and increase France’s isolation. We
shall
have to
decide, at the last minute, whether the costs of a French veto
outweigh the
advantages
of a vote showing majority Security Council support. At present,
our view
329
Minute
Rycroft to Prime Minister, 4 March 2003, ‘Iraq: A
Strategy’.
366