3.1 |
Development of UK strategy and options, 9/11 to early January
2002
378.
Asked whether
Iraq could be persuaded to permit the return of inspectors
“without
an
intensification of military action”, Mr Straw replied:
“… I would
not use the verb persuade. I see some prospect of Iraq coming to
accept
that this
has to happen for the future of the regime as well as the future of
the people
in that
country. I would not put it higher than that but I think there is
some evidence
to that
effect.”
…
“There
certainly has to be an intensification of diplomatic pressure … it
requires
more active
engagement, for example by Russia … and a recognition … that
what
has been an
ambiguous approach to Iraq … is not helpful in terms of the
stability
of the
region and the stability of the international
community.”
379.
Asked if he
thought the rights under the UN Charter extended “to
taking
pre‑emptive
action against a state which the US” believed might attack it, Mr
Straw
replied
that all states had a right to self-defence and he was not going to
be “drawn
into
hypothetical answers to hypothetical questions of the ‘what if’
variety”. If a country
received
“very good information” that it was about to be attacked it could
take action in
self
defence consistent with Article 51 of the UN Charter, but the exact
circumstances
would
vary.
380.
In response to
a final question about Iraq’s programme of developing a
larger
ballistic
missile capability and that it was “possibly developing chemical,
biological,
maybe even
nuclear weapons” and what might happen next after
Afghanistan,
Mr Straw
replied:
“… You are
right to say that Iraq’s building of weapons of mass destruction is
a
very
serious potential threat to the peace and stability of the region
and, therefore,
to the
whole of the international community … [and] to imply that the
international
community
has to take action. There is then a question of what action is best
taken
in respect
of that where care and consideration is required. This is a
separate matter
to
culpability for the atrocities of 11 September … but we are … very
concerned,
about
Iraq’s development of these weapons. We believe that international
action
has to take
place and I have talked already about the dramatic steps which have
to
be
taken.”
375