6.1 |
Development of the military options for an invasion of
Iraq
which would
be ready to commence offensive operations by mid‑April. The
battle
group would
join a US‑led brigade for military operations. The Brigadier
commanding
3 Commando
Brigade and his headquarters would also deploy to join the
headquarters
of CENTCOM
at Bagram airbase.
Mr Hoon
stated that the operation was being conducted in self‑defence in
accordance
with the UN
Charter, “against those elements of Al Qaida and the Taliban that
continue to
threaten
the United Kingdom and other countries”.47
It was the
“largest military deployment
for combat
operations since the Gulf Conflict” in 1991.48
The
deployment was discussed in Cabinet on 21 March.49
Mr Blair
concluded that:
“… the
troops were supported by the majority of the people in Afghanistan
and would
not be
seeking to occupy territory, there was substantial United States
air cover and
there were
troops from several Coalition partners involved. There was no
parallel with
the
occupation of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union. The total number of
British forces
engaged in
operations related to Afghanistan was substantial, but still only
one‑tenth
of the
number deployed during the 1991 Gulf War.”
Turkey took
over lead responsibility for ISAF on 20 June 2002.50
The same
day, Mr Hoon confirmed that the Task Force based on the 45
Commando
battlegroup
would return to the UK on successful completion of Operation
JACANA.51
Drawdown
was completed on 31 July 2002.52
98.
Mr Hoon
wrote to Mr Blair on 22 March emphasising the importance of
a
counter‑proliferation
strategy in the Middle East.
99.
On Iraq,
Mr Hoon advised that the UK should support President Bush
and
be ready to
make a military contribution; and that UK involvement in
planning
would
improve the US process. One of Mr Blair’s objectives at
Crawford should,
therefore,
be to secure agreement to the UK’s participation in military
planning.
100.
Mr Hoon
also stated that a number of issues would need to be
addressed
before
forces were committed, including the need for a comprehensive
public
handling
strategy to explain convincingly why such drastic action against
Iraq’s
WMD was
needed now.
47
House of
Commons, Official
Report, 18 March
2002, column 43.
48
House of
Commons, Official
Report, 18 March
2002, column 40.
49
Cabinet
Conclusions, 21 March 2002.
50
UN Security
Council resolution 1444 (2002).
51
House of
Commons, Official
Report, 20 June
2002, column 407.
52
The
National Archives, [undated], Operation
Veritas.
191