4.1 |
Iraq WMD assessments, pre-July 2002
422.
AM French
commented that the views Mr Webb had heard in the Pentagon
were
“not held
unanimously in Washington”, and the DIS analysis was supported by
their
“US counterparts”:
“If you
take a ‘best case’ scientific and technical approach to this issue,
rather than
using
intelligence, then we judge that Iraq could probably complete its
former simple
warhead
design for air delivery within about a year.”183
423.
On 22 March,
Mr Webb asked Dr Paul Roper, Director Strategic Technology,
for:
“… a second
opinion, in particular on how quickly and under what
circumstances
Iraq might
acquire a deployable nuclear capability. There is a range of
opinions on
this, even
within the US Administration.”184
424.
Mr Webb
asked for a response by 8 April.
425.
Dr Roper
responded that he agreed with the advice in the DIS paper, which
was “a
‘best
guess’ broad based scientific judgement” in circumstances where
hard intelligence
was “a
little thin on the ground”. He added that it was “very important to
distinguish”
between
those two cases.185
426.
Dr Roper wrote
that it was:
“… hard to
believe that Iraq had covertly established a domestic source [of
fissile
material]
given the relatively large signatures of the necessary facilities
and it would
almost
certainly take a few years from start up to acquire enough
material.”
427.
Dr Roper’s
view was that the likelihood of Iraq acquiring fissile material
from
abroad was
“low”, but that was “purely an intelligence matter” not a
scientific judgement.
428.
Dr Roper set
out other components that would be required for a nuclear
weapon
or device,
concluding that even if “against all the odds” Iraq acquired those
components
from a
third party: “The nuclear component would have to be fabricated and
integrated
with the
explosives system and the firing electronics and incorporated in a
bomb case.”
That would
“take some time and the one year ‘guesstimate’ is
reasonable”.
429.
Dr Roper
pointed out that work could be carried out in advance of the
acquisition
of fissile
material. In that case “it might take only a few weeks to complete
assembly”
once
fissile material was obtained. Whether such activity would be
detected was an
“intelligence
judgement”.
183
Minute CDI
to Policy Director, 21 March 2002, ‘Iraq – Nuclear
Weapons’.
184
Minute
PS/Policy Director to D Strat Tech, 22 March 2002, ‘Iraq – Nuclear
Weapons’.
185
Minute
Roper to Policy Director, 27 March 2002, ‘Iraq – Nuclear
Weapons’.
91