4.4 | The
search for WMD
941.
Mr Scarlett
sent Mr Duelfer “nuggets” from the September 2003 ISG
Interim
Report,
including on strategic intent, explaining that they were not
intended as
drafting
suggestions, but to identify existing ISG material worth
highlighting. Many of
Mr Scarlett’s
suggestions were incorporated into Mr Duelfer’s testimony to
Congress
on 30 March.
942.
Mr Duelfer’s
testimony received little publicity. Mr Blair was advised
that, given
the
security situation in Iraq, it would be extremely difficult to get
further coverage in
anything
other than negative terms.
943.
Mr Blair
remained concerned about continuing public and
Parliamentary
criticism
of the pre-conflict intelligence, the failure to find WMD and the
decision
to invade
Iraq. After the reports from the Hutton Inquiry, the ISG and the
US
Commission,
he sought to demonstrate that, although “the exact basis for
action
was not as
we thought”, the invasion had still been justified.
944.
Mr Blair
told President Bush on 16 June that he remained “deeply
concerned”
about WMD.
He expressed the wish that “if at all possible”, the reports of the
Senate
Intelligence
Committee, the Butler Review and the ISG “should have this issue
dealt with
and lanced
all at the same time”.
945.
Mr Blair
suggested to President Bush that the truth on Iraq’s WMD was
probably
that Saddam
Hussein:
“… was
developing long range ballistic missile capability in breach of UN
resolutions;
he probably
had no or no large stockpiles of tactical CW or BW weapons; but
he
retained
the capability and expertise to recommence production as soon as
he
could,
again in breach of UN resolutions …
“Such an
explanation would mean that some of the intelligence upon which we
acted
was wrong;
but that nonetheless the threat was there, as was the breach of
UN
resolutions.
It would also explain why the picture was so confused and why,
whilst
the exact
basis of action was not as we thought, the action was still
justified.”
946.
Mr Blair
suggested that it might make sense to publish the ISG
Comprehensive
Report at
the same time as the Senate Intelligence Committee and Butler
Reports to
“provide
the clear evidential basis for saying there was indeed a threat,
even if it was not
the threat
that had been anticipated”.
947.
Immediately
before and after the publication of the Senate Intelligence
Committee
and Butler
Reports on 7 and 14 July respectively, Mr Blair restated
his conviction that
Iraq had
posed a threat and that military action had been necessary to make
progress in
Libya and
elsewhere.
948.
On
6 July, Mr Blair told the Liaison Committee of the House
of Commons that he
had to
accept that stockpiles of WMD “might not be found”, but it was
“absolutely clear”
that Saddam
Hussein had the “strategic capability, the intent” and that he had
committed
multiple
breaches of UN sanctions.
609