9.7 | May
2008 to October 2009
264.
Mr Brown
met ACM Stirrup on 4 December for a “personal and
confidential”
discussion.102
On Iraq,
Mr Brown said that it looked as though Prime Minister
Maliki
would
accept a legal agreement that included fixed dates for the
withdrawal of UK
troops. It
would be important for the UK to show that the withdrawal was
happening
because the
UK had completed all the tasks it had set out. A “last push” on
economic
development
was needed, along with a communications plan for the next few
weeks.
265.
ACM Stirrup
said that he hoped there would be cross-party support for a
message
of UK
success. Although it was “never the intention to have transformed
Basra”,
nonetheless
“we would have got it to the starting point”. UK troop numbers
would
reduce significantly
in June, with the US brigade combat team arriving in May to “do
their
own
tasks”.
266.
Reporting his
visit to Iraq to the Iraq; Strategy Group on 5 December,
Mr McDonald
said that
Prime Minster Maliki had agreed combat authorisations to enable UK
forces
to complete
the training of 14 Division and to continue naval operations in the
northern
Gulf.103
Rather than
putting a legal agreement to the Council of Representatives,
there
would be an
exchange of letters between the two Governments. He added
that:
“The
imminent declaration by the Attorney General that a state of
Internal Armed
Conflict in
Iraq continued to exist would be necessary to underpin the legal
basis.”
267.
Mr McDonald
described three possible scenarios, all of which NSID(OD)
would
need to
consider:
•
An exchange
of letters with the Iraqi Government, providing a legal basis
for
combat
operations, but not as robust as a full SOFA. Ministers would need
to
decide if
they were content with this.
•
Political
agreement with the Iraqi Government, with an uncertain legal
basis.
The UK
would have to consider what it could still do, relying on the right
to
self defence.
•
No
agreement reached, meaning transition to a “normal bilateral
relationship”
from
January 2009.
268.
NSID(OD)
discussed Iraq on 9 December 2008.104
269.
Papers
provided for the meeting included ‘Iraq: Arrangements for
Transition’.105
The paper
recounted Mr McDonald’s scenarios and Ministers were invited
to consider
“the
implications of the three scenarios for the UK’s reputation, and
what the Armed
Forces
would be able to do in each”. If no legal agreement was achieved,
Ministers were
102
Letter
Catsaras to Rimmer, 4 December 2008, ‘Prime Minister’s meeting with
Chief of Defence Staff,
4 December’.
103
Minute
Cabinet Office [junior official] to McDonald, 8 December 2008,
‘Iraq Strategy Group,
5 December’.
104
Minutes, 9
December 2008, NSID(OD) meeting.
105
Paper by
Officials, 8 December 2008, ‘Iraq: Arrangements for
Transition’.
425