The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

“Given the demonstrated unpredictability of Saddam Hussein’s regime, it is

impossible to make definitive judgements capable of being ascribed [with] absolute

certainty when considering what might occur in any given hypothetical situation. The

recent JIC paper … [of 13 December 2000] reflects this uncertainty. But we can,

based on past experience and informed assessment of the nature of that regime,

arrive at assessments to which we attach a high degree of confidence.”

160. Mr McKane repeated the JIC’s Assessment of the risks of withdrawing both the

southern and northern NFZs, and added:

“In the event that UK and US operations in the southern No-Fly Zone were to cease,

no one can predict with absolute certainty how Saddam Hussein would act or what

the consequences would be for the Shia population. Air power would give Saddam

more military options. He used air power, including helicopter gunships, against

the Shia population in 1991 and 1992. If the southern No-Fly Zone were lifted, he

would do so again. More effective persecution of the Shia would add to their misery,

and would risk provoking another cycle of uprising and brutal repression. A grave

humanitarian crisis would result …

“In addition, any judgement on the utility of the southern No-Fly Zone in preventing

a humanitarian disaster must take into account the likely impact on our ability to

prevent one in the north. We believe that, if UK and US operations in the southern

No-Fly Zone were to cease, it would be more difficult to sustain the necessary

political support for the northern No-Fly Zone …

“Our overall judgement remains that there is an unacceptably high risk that, in the

event that we cease patrolling the southern No-Fly Zone, extreme humanitarian

distress would result on a scale comparable to that which led to grave humanitarian

crisis and the establishment of the Zones in 1991 and 1992.

“This assessment will be kept under review. The judgement it contains could change

if alternative arrangements for preventing further humanitarian catastrophe in Iraq

emerge from the review of policy … on which we and the US Government are now

embarked.”

161. Lord Williams asked to see earlier drafts of the letter before responding.91

162. The Attorney General concluded that it was still possible on balance to argue

that the maintenance of the NFZs was justified, although that argument was now