The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
much aware
of their obligation to minimise the risk of civilian casualties and
collateral
damage”. US
assessments in respect of targets were based “on more
sophisticated
modelling
and have the benefit of a much greater range of weaponeering
solutions
than
assessments made by the UK targeting staff in respect of RAF
targets”. The letter
concluded
that: “In circumstances … where there is … no clear reason to
challenge
US
targeting judgements, he [Mr Hoon] takes the view that we should
take on trust
assurances
provided by … our closest ally.”
355.
Mr Brummell
wrote to Mr McKane on 24 August informing him that Lord
Goldsmith
intended to
carry out his review of the legal justification for the maintenance
of the
NFZs during
September; and that he had asked whether there was any
additional
information
which departments wished to draw to his attention, and whether
there were
any
developments subsequent to Mr McKane’s update of 28
June.195
Copies of
the letter
were sent
to the MOD, the FCO and No.10 officials.
356.
Mr Brummell
also asked for clarification on a number of specific
points:
•
Whether
departments could “expand on the assessment that a decision
to
move away
from patrolling the south would make it more difficult to sustain
the
necessary
political support for the northern No-Fly Zone”.
•
Whether it
was possible to expand the assessment of the “likelihood” of
a “grave
humanitarian
crisis” occurring as a result of persecution of the
Shia.
•
Whether
departments could direct him “to the precise materials
and/or
passages”
in “the MOD’s comprehensive review of the Zones” on which
the
conclusion
that “no other arrangements have been identified which
would
obviate the
need to conduct regular patrols over Iraqi territory” had been
based.
•
Whether the
assessment in Mr Patey’s letter of 29 January that there
might
be “scope
for adjustment” in relation to the northern NFZ remained valid,
and
if it did
whether it affected “the assessment of whether there are any
practical
alternatives
to patrolling the northern No-Fly Zone if lives are to be
saved”.
357.
Mr McKane
forwarded a copy of the letter to Sir David Manning, Mr
Blair’s
Foreign Policy
Adviser, with the comment:
“You need
to be aware of this correspondence. I’ve got the matter in hand
–
I’ll probably
ask the MOD to produce a draft reply for discussion with them and
FCO
– but I may
need to ask you to weigh in if the Attorney is unconvinced
by
358.
Copies of the
letter were circulated widely within the MOD, and to Mr
Hoon.
195
Letter
Brummell to McKane, 24 August 2001, ‘Iraq’.
196
Manuscript
comment McKane to Manning, 3 September 2001, on Letter Brummell to
McKane,
24 August
2001, ‘Iraq’.
260