8 | The
invasion
all
secured. The sooner the oil could flow again, the sooner the
profits could be used
for the
Iraqi people. The Iraqi regime had been successfully denied the use
of its WMD.
Wider
conflict inside Iraq and in the region had been deterred. The
leading elements
of the US
forces were about 60 miles south of Baghdad where they were likely
to be
opposed by
four divisions of the Iraqi Republican Guard. That confrontation
would be a
crucial
event in the military campaign. Baghdad and other centres of
population needed
to be
isolated so that totalitarian control was diminished.
248.
The regime’s
brutal intimidation was deterring Iraqis from rising up.
Nevertheless,
Saddam
Hussein had lost control of most of southern Iraq. Handling Basra,
where there
was the
potential for a popular uprising although it had so far been held
in check by the
regime’s
militia, could be a model for application in Baghdad.
249.
Cabinet also
discussed the humanitarian situation and the responsibility of
the
military as
the Occupying Power to provide humanitarian relief. Mr Gordon
Brown,
the
Chancellor of the Exchequer, said that he was making available an
additional
£120m for
humanitarian relief and raising the allocation of funds for the
conflict from
£1.75bn to £3bn.
250.
Later on 27
March, Mr Blair, Mr Straw, President Bush, Secretary
Powell and
Dr Rice
and others at Camp David participated in a video conference with
Mr Hoon and
Adm Boyce
in London and Mr Donald Rumsfeld (US Defense Secretary) and
Gen Myers
in
Washington.150
Mr Hoon
described Basra as “a microcosm of the successes and
limitations
of Coalition operations across the country”; “regime loyalists”
remained in
control of
key areas, intimidating the urban population.
251.
Mr Blair
stated that seizing Basra could have a huge impact on the
wider
“…
underlined the strategic dilemma: the fall of Basra would send an
important
message of
the beginnings of the collapse of the Saddam regime, but
deploying
adequate
forces to achieve this in the absence of a local uprising would
divert from
the top
objective of reaching Baghdad. Indeed there was a case for shifting
forces
from Basra
to reinforce the drive on Baghdad.” 152
150
Minute
Cannon to Rycroft, 27 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s
video-conference with Bush,
27 March’.
151
Minute
PS/SofS [MOD ] to DG Op Pol, 27 March 2003, ‘Iraq: VTC with Camp
David: 27 March 2003’.
152
Minute
Cannon to Rycroft, 27 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s
video-conference with Bush,
27 March’.
43