The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
An IED is a
bomb constructed and activated in ways other than through
conventional
military
action. The types most commonly encountered in Iraq
were:
Radio‑Controlled
IED (RCIED): This uses a
radio signal to initiate detonation – a number
of
different commercial devices were used in Iraq such as doorbells,
burglar alarms and
radio‑controlled
cars.61
Radio‑controlled
detonation meant that an explosion on a specific
target
could be initiated by an operator situated a safe distance away.
Those were the
most
commonly used type of IED in Iraq between 2003 and mid‑2005. UK
electronic
countermeasures
were used to jam the detonation signal.
Command Wire
IED (CWIED): This uses a
wire to transmit the signal to detonate.62
It
is
a
retrograde form of technology and had the disadvantage of requiring
a wire dug into the
ground, or
concealment through other means, but they became more common in
Iraq from
2006
onwards as they were immune to any form of electronic
countermeasure.
Explosively
Formed Projectile (EFP): A directional
charge designed to defeat armour
by using
the energy of the explosive to create a projectile that travels at
between one and
three
kilometres per second towards its target.63
EFPs were
commonly used as charges
for IEDs in
Iraq from mid‑2004 onwards.
Passive
Infrared IED (PIR IED): An evolution
from RCIEDs where passive infrared
beams are
used remotely to detonate IEDs. The first of those attacks in
MND(SE) was in
May 2005
and indicated an attempt to circumvent the UK’s electronic
countermeasures.
135.
On 2 July
2003, the JIC issued an Assessment about potential flashpoints in
Iraq
over the
next two to three years.64
It focused
on “potential negative outcomes rather
than positive
ones”.
136.
The JIC judged
that extremist groups currently posed a direct threat to
Coalition
Forces,
but:
“For now,
the activities of these groups are largely unco‑ordinated. However,
it is
likely that
the links between groups will become stronger.”
137.
The Assessment
stated that there had been no sign of an organised
campaign
of violence
against Coalition Forces by Shia groups “so far”. There had,
however,
been
reports that the two main armed Shia groups (the Badr Corps and the
followers
of Muqtada
al‑Sadr) had “recently been trying to acquire large quantities of
weapons”.
The JIC
stated that there were indications that they were “preparing for
intra‑Shia conflict
(as opposed
to anti‑Coalition activity)”. That would add to instability and it
was “probable”
that
Coalition Forces would “be caught up in violence”.
61
Paper DIS,
September 2003, ‘An Analysis of the Major IED Threats to Coalition
Forces in Iraq’.
62
Paper DIS,
1 October 2004, ‘The Command Wire Improvised Explosive Device
Threat to UK Forces
in Iraq’.
63
Paper DIS,
May 2006, ‘The EFP Threat in MND(SE)’.
64
JIC
Assessment, 2 July 2003, ‘Iraq: Potential
Flashpoints’.
26