3.7 | Development of UK strategy and options, 1 February to 7 March 2003

787. Mr Straw added:

“Worse, this delay would send Saddam the clearest possible signal that his strategy

is succeeding. It would tell him that the international community lacked the will

to disarm him, and it would tell all those who threaten our security that Saddam

Hussein has broken the United Nations as an instrument for defending peace

through the force of international law.”

788. Mr Straw argued against persisting with a policy of containment. That was “not the

policy of disarmament as set out in resolution 1441 or any of the preceding resolutions”.

There could be “no stable, steady state for Iraq unless it is properly disarmed”. Nor could

there be stability for the region and the international community: “What may appear

to be containment to others is rearmament for Saddam.” “Far from keeping a lid on

Saddam’s ambitions”, the policy of containment between 1998 and 2002 had “allowed

him to rebuild his horrific arsenal, his chemical and biological weapons, and the means

of delivering them”. Mr Straw cited Iraq’s refurbishment of prohibited equipment and the

building of a missile test stand as proof of that activity. Containment required “a degree

of trust in Saddam that we cannot risk and which runs contrary to all the evidence”.

789. In relation to questions about double standards, especially in relation to Israel

and Palestine, Mr Straw said that he and Mr Blair accepted that there had been a

“considerable amount to that charge” but the way to deal with that was “not by ignoring

outstanding UN obligations, but by working even harder to see all of them implemented”.

The UK was “working actively to implement” UN policy on Israel/Palestine “including the

early publication of the Road Map”.

790. Mr Straw stated:

“International terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are the

crucial strategic questions of our time. Our answer to the threats will determine the

stability of the world for decades to come. This is an awesome responsibility. It calls

for courageous leadership and it requires a vision and foresight to act decisively

and, if necessary, with military force.”

791. Mr Straw concluded that a “moment of choice” had been reached for Saddam

Hussein and for the Iraqi regime, and for the United Nations. The:

“… issue of what we do about tyrannical states with poison gases, nerve agents,

viruses and nuclear ambitions, and which defy international law and the principles

of the UN, will not go away. We have to face the issue. We have to give Saddam

Hussein a categorical choice, and after 12 long years he has to give us his

answer now.”

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