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The Report of the Iraq Inquiry
explains why any evidence that inspections may be showing progress is greeted in
Washington not with satisfaction but with consternation: it reduces the case for war.”
859.  Mr Cook concluded that the British people:
“… do not doubt that Saddam is a brutal dictator, but they are not persuaded that
he is a clear and present danger to Britain. They want inspections to be given a
chance, and they suspect that they are being pushed too quickly into conflict by a
US Administration with an agenda of its own. Above all they are uneasy at Britain
going out on a limb on a military adventure without a broader international coalition
and against the hostility of many of our traditional allies.”
860.  Mr Cook’s account of his view of the September dossier and the briefing he was
given in February 2003 by Mr Scarlett are addressed in Sections 4.2 and 4.3 respectively.
Ms Short’s letter, 18 March 2003
Ms Short sent a letter to colleagues in the Parliamentary Labour Party the following
morning, explaining her reasons for deciding to support the Government.307 She wrote that
there had been “a number of important developments over the last week”, including:
“Firstly, the Attorney General has made clear that military action would be legal under
international law. Other lawyers have expressed contrary opinions. But for the UK
Government, the civil service and the military, it is the view of the Attorney General
that matters and this is unequivocal.”
President Bush’s ultimatum to Saddam Hussein, 17 March 2003
861.  President Bush issued an ultimatum giving Saddam Hussein 48 hours to
leave Iraq.
862.  The British Embassy Washington reported that the US media had:
“… recognised the Azores outcome as the beginning of the end game, and declared
the diplomatic process dead even before we announced the end in the Security
Council … Both the Washington Post and the New York Times referred to the US
and its allies ‘going through the motions’.”308
863.  The Embassy wrote that US commentators were:
“… already apportioning blame for the Administration’s failure to muster
international support …
“The longer-term fallout from almost six months of activity at the UN would probably
only be clear once the war is over. But the media has already gone into analysis
307  Short C. An Honourable Deception: New Labour, Iraq and the Misuse of Power. The Free Press, 2004.
308  Telegram 354 Washington to FCO London, 18 March 2003, ‘US/Iraq: Update’.
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