The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
269.
Mr McKane
reported that there had been several discussions with the US on
the
NFZs, and
that:
“We are
agreed that we need to retain the No-Fly Zones. Not only do they
serve
a
humanitarian purpose, but the southern No-Fly Zone is also
necessary for the
defence of
Kuwait and Saudi Arabia … We think it may be possible to reduce
the
size of the
No-Fly Zones … there has not been a positive US reaction.
Defence
officials
continue to discuss the scope for adjusting the pattern of
patrolling but the
military
advice, which the Defence Secretary has endorsed, is that there is
only
modest
scope to do so without placing our air crew at greater risk. We
need to keep
the legal
position under review (the Attorney General has asked for a further
report
by the end
of May) but any deterrent option which did not rely on the
Southern
No‑Fly Zone
would entail a greater risk that Kuwait could be overrun before
an
effective
military response could be put in place.”
270.
Mr McKane
reported that a draft ‘Contract with the Iraqi People’, which
reflected
Ms Short’s
concerns about a continuing key role for international agencies,
had been
shared with
the US.
271.
Mr Blair
responded that getting a deal under which Iraq’s neighbours agreed
to
bring all
Iraqi oil revenues under UN control was the “essential quid pro
quo” for better
272.
In response to
a number of diplomatic telegrams which had described the
NFZs
as
necessary for the defence of Kuwait, Mr Iain Macleod, FCO Legal
Counsellor, asked
colleagues
on 6 April to remind diplomatic posts “of the need to ensure that
the legal
justification
for the zones (the prevention of a humanitarian catastrophe) is
kept distinct
from other
policy advantages which they may bring”.149
273.
Reviewing the
Treasury/Bank of England paper on the options for
amending
financial
sanctions in early May, Mr McKane concluded that there were options
for
easing
sanctions without legislation, but that should be kept under review
“until we
have
thought through the full implications and seen the effect of other
changes under
consideration”.150
The
possibility of replacing the comprehensive regime with a
targeted
asset
freeze would require amendment to resolution 661(1990). That was
not seen as a
“near-term
option”.
274.
An
Assessment issued on 10 May marked a shift in the JIC’s perception
of
Iraq’s
intentions and activities in relation to WMD.
148
Minute
Wechsberg to McKane, 9 April 2001, ‘Iraq’.
149
Minute
Macleod to Patey, 6 April 2001, ‘Iraq: No Fly Zones’.
150
Letter
McKane to Goulty, 11 May 2001, ‘Iraq: Financial
Sanctions’.
244