9.3 | July 2004 to May 2005

8. When the AHMGIR met, the FCO was commissioned to co-ordinate an integrated

UK strategy covering the period up to Iraqi elections.3

9. On 2 July, the Assessments Staff reported “no major attacks over the transition

period, and a distinct downturn in lower-level attacks, especially in Baghdad”; probably

attributable to bringing forward the handover date and increased security measures as it

approached.4

10. In the first few days of July, Mr Edward Chaplin arrived in Baghdad to take up post

as the first British Ambassador to Iraq for 13 years.5

11. Mr Chaplin told the Inquiry that “the overall priority for the Embassy … was the

support of the political process and making sure that elections could take place on time

at the end of January 2005”.6

12. On 5 July, the Assessments Staff provided Sir Nigel Sheinwald, Mr Blair’s Foreign

Policy Adviser, with statistics on the number of attacks against the Multi-National Force –

Iraq (MNF-I) and Iraqi targets which showed that there had been a reduction:

“… at some 400/week, however, it is still running well above the rate in January/

February.” 7

13. Sir Nigel commented in manuscript to Mr Blair that there were “some, tentative,

positive signs”.

14. Mr Blair spoke to President Bush by video conference on 6 July and commented

that although insurgents would continue their activities, overall the security situation was

better.8 In the South-East, Iraqis were increasingly in the lead on security.

15. Mr Blair was concerned to remind the public about Saddam Hussein’s use of

chemical weapons and to expose and document the human rights abuses which had

taken place during his regime.

16. A meeting of the Iraq Strategy Group on 9 July noted:

“… the withdrawal of the MNF was likely to be a key [Iraqi] election issue. While we

remained committed to help Iraq with security, we needed to start thinking about the

possibility that we would be reducing our presence in Iraq during 2005. We would

want to avoid the appearance of our assistance being rebuffed.” 9

3 Minutes, 1 July 2004, Ad Hoc Group on Iraq Rehabilitation meeting.

4 Minute Dowse to Sheinwald, 2 July 2004, ‘Iraq Update – 2 July’.

5 Public hearing, 7 December 2009, pages 1-2.

6 Public hearing, 7 December 2009, page 6.

7 Minute Dowse to Sheinwald, 5 July 2004, ‘Iraq Attack Statistics’ including Manuscript comment

Sheinwald to Prime Minister.

8 Letter Quarrey to Owen, 6 July 2004, ‘Prime Minister’s VTC with Bush, 6 July: Iraq’.

9 Minute Cabinet Office [junior official] to Sheinwald, 13 July 2004, ‘Iraq: Strategy Group’.

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