11.1 |
De-Ba’athification
79.
On 3 June,
Ambassador Bremer signed CPA Memorandum No.1, which
described
the
implementation of Order No.1 (de‑Ba’athification) and Order No.5
(creation of the
Iraqi
de‑Ba’athification Council).76
80.
The Memorandum
described an interim process for identifying Ba’ath
Party
members
using Coalition military investigators. It said:
“As the
Administrator determines that the responsibility for identifying
Ba’ath Party
members
effectively can be transferred to Iraqi citizens, the Administrator
shall direct
the Iraqi
de‑Ba’athification Council to assume an increasingly significant
role in
carrying
out the de‑Ba’athification process.
“Initially,
the Council will advise the Coalition on de‑Ba’athification
policies and
procedures
…”
81.
The Memorandum
also established Accreditation Review Committees, to
hear
appeals and
requests for exemption. Relevant factors for consideration would
be:
“… whether
the individual:
i. Is
willing to denounce the Ba’ath Party and his past association with
it;
ii. Was a
senior Ba’ath Party member or simply a ‘full’ party
member;
iii. Has
exceptional educational qualifications;
iv. Left
the Ba’ath Party before April 16, 2003;
v.
Continues to command the support of his colleagues and respect of
their
subordinates;
vi. Is
judged to be indispensible to achieving important Coalition
interests; at least
in the
immediate term;
vii. Can
demonstrate that he joined the party to hold his job or support his
family.”
82.
In early June,
Sir Kevin Tebbit, MOD Permanent Under Secretary, reported that
he
had
observed in a recent visit to Iraq that the implementation of the
de‑Ba’athification
policy was
posing difficulties for UK personnel in the South but that “General
Wall seems
to think
that he can work quietly to achieve the flexibility he needs
without taking US
76
Coalition
Provisional Authority Memorandum Number 1: Implementation of
De‑Ba’athification
Order
No. 1.
77
Minute
Tebbit to Secretary of State, 3 June 2003, ‘Visit to Basrah and
Baghdad’.
19