3.5 |
Development of UK strategy and options, September to November 2002
–
the
negotiation of resolution 1441
800.
Mr Straw
told Cabinet on 7 November that the vote on the resolution on Iraq
was
likely to
take place the following day and described its
provisions.273
The aim was
to
achieve
unanimity, which would be a triumph for UK and American
diplomacy.
801.
In discussion,
it was suggested that:
•
public
opinion in the US, which had in the past not been supportive of the
UN,
was now
supportive of the multilateral approach;
•
inspections
had to be done properly and would need to be backed by a
sufficient
level of
military threat to ensure Iraq’s compliance;
•
the facts
of any breach would be reported by the inspectors, with the
Security
Council
having to judge what the facts meant; and
•
media
speculation that pressure on Iraq was about access to oil supplies
and
that
British companies would be disadvantaged was not
helpful.
802.
Mr Blair
concluded that “after the return of inspectors tricky questions
would arise
about
whether Iraq had breached its obligations and what steps should be
taken”.
The
resolution “should send a clear message to Iraq in terms of what
the international
community
required and the consequences of non‑compliance”. The “need to
move
forward on
the Middle East Peace Process had not been
overlooked”.
803.
In preparation
for a discussion between Mr Straw and Lord Goldsmith,
Mr Wood
wrote to
Mr Straw on 6 November offering his view of the legal
considerations.274
Mr Wood
emphasised that it was important that anything said by the
Government, either
publicly or
to the US or others, was not incompatible with the position under
international
law. All
statements, including Explanations of Vote and Parliamentary
Statements,
should be
seen by the Legal Secretariat to the Law Officers.
804.
Mr Wood
identified “the most difficult question on which doubtless we shall
be
pressed, is
what the legal position would be if [in the event of a further
material breach
by Iraq]
the Council ‘fails to act’ at a second stage”. He
wrote:
“The first
resolution [what became 1441] … does not itself authorise the use
of force,
or revive
the authorisation to use force given in SCR 678. Although OP1
decides
that Iraq
has been and remains in material breach of the cease‑fire
resolution, the
remaining
paragraphs (and in particular OPs 11 and 12) indicate that the
Council
has decided
to take action itself if the breach continues or if there are
further
violations.
This is the case even though OP4 remains in the
resolution.
273
Cabinet
Conclusions, 7 November 2002.
274
Minute Wood
to PS [FCO], 6 November 2002, ‘Iraq: Legal Basis for the Possible
Use of Force’.
337