8 | The
invasion
“The
security situation in a growing number of areas is such that troops
are
patrolling
on foot rather than in armoured cars, and have in some cases been
able
to exchange
their combat helmets for berets.” 196
370.
Mr Hoon
also stated that the Iraqi regime had suppressed disturbances in
Basra
on 25 March
and opened fire on civilians preparing to leave Basra on 28
March.
371.
Adm Boyce told
the Ad Hoc Meeting on Iraq on 4 April that UK forces had
made
a
“lodgement” in Basra and continued to apply pressure on the
militia, whose ability to
maintain
control of the city “was diminishing”.197
372.
On the same
day, Mr Ingram and Air Chief Marshal Sir Peter Squire, Chief
of the
Air Staff,
gave a press conference at the Ministry of Defence.198
Mr Ingram
told reporters:
“… the
Coalition has seen further steady progress both in terms of
military advance
and in
terms of the other crucial battle … winning the confidence of the
Iraqi people
through
increased normalisation and security.
“… two
halves of equal importance and our military campaign objectives
reflect
this fully.
“… What has
been particularly important about the way this campaign
has
developed
is the relationship between these twin objectives … as the war
fighting
progresses
to a conclusion, we are implementing, at times simultaneously, a
security
framework
for peace.
“… Our
approach to the assault on Basra is highly illustrative of this.
There is no
question
that the fire power available … could be used to a more immediate
but
destructive
effect … Our restraint should not be interpreted as weakness,
rather it
is a sign
of care … The city of Basra is contained. Our commanders on the
ground
will use
their own professionalism and sound military judgement to decide
when and
how to
enter the city.”
373.
The press
conference also addressed the conduct of the air campaign.
Mr Ingram
stressed
the greater focus on precision in that campaign and that “our
overriding
concern has
been to minimise … civilian casualties and unnecessary casualties
on out
own side”.
Targeting policy had been driven by “a clear moral imperative to
minimise
civilian
casualties. There is of course a legal obligation to do the same …
[and] a
practical
argument derived from our post-conflict ambitions for
Iraq”.
196
House of
Commons, Official
Report, 3 April
2003, columns 1069-1071.
197
Minutes, 4
April 2003, Ad Hoc Meeting on Iraq.
198
GlobalSecurity.org,
4 April 2003, Minister of
State for the Armed Forces and the Chief of the Air
Staff:
Press
Conference at the Ministry of Defence, London – 4 April
2003.
63