9.3 |
July 2004 to May 2005
257.
Lt Gen McColl
characterised the insurgency in Iraq as “an extreme
manifestation
of the
national pride felt by the overwhelming majority of the public, who
feel a deep-
seated
desire to ‘liberate’ Iraq from foreign ‘occupation’”. He judged
that the diverse
groups with
the insurgency co-operated “purely to be rid of MNF-I”, and were
unified by
high
unemployment and shared religion. Based on “objective metrics” such
as number
of attacks
and casualty rates, the insurgency was “increasing in intensity and
lethality,
and is
sustainable in the medium term”.
258.
Although there
were troops from 30 nations deployed as part of the
coalition,
Lt Gen
McColl recorded that only the UK sought to influence the campaign
strategy
and
operational policy in theatre. On a number of occasions, the UK had
successfully
influenced
the conduct of the campaign in line with its own strategic
objectives.
That influence
was based on “the political capital invested”, troop
contribution,
financial
contribution, the quality of staff officers and counter-insurgency
expertise.
However, repeated
rejections of US requests for the deployment of UK
resources
beyond
MND(SE) had “chipped away at the US/UK relationship”.
259.
In summary,
the report said: “Our wish to contribute to campaign direction
beyond
the
boundaries of MND(SE) needs to be visibly supported by a reasonable
commitment
and
participation if we are to retain credibility.”
260.
Lt Gen McColl
wrote that:
“Ejection
of the coalition in 05 would risk mission failure but the timing of
planned
withdrawal
thereafter is critical … there is much to commend a withdrawal in
early
06 in
accordance with the UN mandate. This is the natural political,
legal and (if we
do our job
well) security culminating point.
“If we are
indeed to be committed to withdraw at that point, then we should
seriously
consider
announcing that intention early. Any such announcement would
undercut
the
insurgency, address public suspicion over MNF-I’s long-term
intentions, and
reinforce
the moderates of all hues.”
261.
That view was
not, however, shared by everyone:
“Discussions
with US interlocutors have identified little appetite for declaring
early …
based upon
the underlying perception … that the operation will extend well
beyond
2006
…
“Any end
state that envisages a continued coalition presence after the
spring of 06
(allowing
time to withdraw) would require either a new UN mandate or the
consent of
the Iraqi
Government … It is at this point that the national goals of
coalition members
may
diverge. No firm decisions on the long-term US presence have been
made,
but some US
planning at least envisages a long-term basing strategy. Current
UK
planning
does not. As such, there is, therefore, a pressing need to define
[the] UK’s
long-term
end state in the region, and to accept that this may differ from
that of the
US. If a
decision is made that [the] UK’s national interest lies alongside
that of the
437