6.4 |
Planning and preparation for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, mid-2001
to January 2003
248.
The March
update from the British Embassy Amman, issued at the beginning
of
April,
reported a number of demonstrations in Baghdad against recent
Israeli incursions
into
Palestinian territory.139
The Embassy
commented that:
“Iraqis no
doubt are willing to demonstrate on this issue to vent anti-Western
feeling
and disgust
at Israeli action against an Arab state. But they are unlikely to
put their
necks on
the line by demonstrating out of turn. Support is also tempered by
anger
that so
much Iraqi money is being given to the Palestinians instead of
being used to
address the
problems at home …”
249.
The Embassy
reported that there had been rumours Saddam Hussein
was
“threatening
to use chemical weapons in Baghdad itself if necessary to quell
any
uprising.
Stockpiling of food and enough fuel to get to the border is now
standard
amongst
families in Baghdad.”
250.
In the April
update, the Embassy reported “mixed stories” of the mood on
the
street in
Baghdad: “Some say that Iraqis are used to American threats and
simply do
not believe
that the regime will ever fall. Others report a freer atmosphere in
Baghdad,
encouraged
by the possibility of change at the end of the
year.”140
251.
The May update
contained some insights into both social and
infrastructure
issues.141
It
highlighted Saddam Hussein’s “scare tactics” over what would happen
in
the event
of a coalition invasion of Iraq and the possibility of Iraqi and
regional instability
thereafter:
“This line plays on real fears of the unknown and of religious
instability. For all
his faults,
Saddam does, for now, mean stability and peace.”
252.
The May report
also included a snapshot of communications
infrastructure
in Baghdad:
a medical student had reported significant difficulty accessing
the
internet, both
because of state controls on what could be viewed but also
because
of limited
server access. Illegal access via satellite to both the internet
and
international news
(copied onto CD and then sold) was becoming popular but
was
both expensive
and risky.
253.
On 6 June, the
DIS assessed that, while there were undoubtedly divisions
between
Shia and
Sunni groups in Iraq, these were not straightforward. The
interaction between
tribal
allegiance, Arab identity, religious affiliation and political
persuasion was highly
complex.142
The
relationship between some tribes was characterised by
“general
lawlessness
and brigandry … and occasional incidents of inter-tribal conflict”,
leading
the DIS to
question whether the activities of southern tribal insurgents
really represented
a political
challenge to Saddam Hussein’s regime rather than simply traditional
tribal
activity
that had always resented central government rule.
139
Teleletter
Amman [junior official] to MED [junior official], 4 April 2002,
‘Iraq: March sitrep’.
140
Teleletter
Amman [junior official] to MED [junior official], 6 May 2002,
‘Iraq: April sitrep’.
141
Teleletter
Amman [junior official] to MED [junior official], 9 June 2002,
‘Iraq: May sitrep’.
142
Paper DIS,
6 June 2002, ‘The Iraqi tribes: their identity and role in internal
security’.
157