The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
“war‑fighting”,
it could be enough to “sow the seeds of uncertainty in the minds of
the
decision‑makers
in Baghdad”.
465.
“In several
significant ways,” the northern option was “very attractive”. It
offered
the UK the
“opportunity to make a discrete contribution to the operation, but
it also offers
an
opportunity to integrate other allies into the operation”. It
would, however, be “highly
challenging”
and would require “not only Turkish acquiescence, but also full
Turkish
support
along the line of communication”. That would require US
involvement.
466.
Because “a
good proportion of UK maritime and air assets” would be
integrated
into the
wider US effort, the force in the North would need to be confident
that support
from the US
would be available “as and when required”. That was an issue
that
remained to
be explored.
467.
Mr Bowen
also reported that CENTCOM understood the strategic benefit of
a
UK‑led
“northern effort”, but it was “not yet clear how important it is to
their overall plan”.
468.
Mr Bowen
advised Mr Hoon that it was “also assessed as militarily
unwise to
integrate
anything less than a division into the US land component”, and that
“it would
be militarily
unattractive to commit UK land forces to US operations from
Kuwait.”
469.
On 26 July,
the MOD provided advice on options for a UK contribution to
US‑led
military
operations in Iraq in a letter to Mr Rycroft.198
470.
The MOD
advised that US military planning was “in full swing but it was
still
evolving”.
The concept was for an attack launched by forces deployed in Kuwait
and
from other
Gulf States and from ships in the Gulf and elsewhere. The plan was
“neither
fully
developed nor finalised”. The Chiefs of Staff were “not yet able to
judge whether this
is a
winning concept”. Greater clarity would be needed “before any UK
option could be
recommended”.
471.
The MOD stated
that it was “clear that the US plan of attack from the South”
did
not “need
British land forces”:
“… in the
time available there is very little scope for the preparation and
integration
of British
land forces into the US order of battle; moreover the logistic
space
available
in Kuwait, with five divisions worth of equipment and logistics
support
entering
through only one airhead and a single port would already be
confined …”
472.
Adm Boyce had
recommended three options:
•
Package
1: an
“in‑place support package” using forces already in the
region.
•
Package
2: an
“enhanced support package” comprising Package 1 with
additional
air and maritime forces. This package could include forces that
would
be “of
particular interest to the US because of their own deficiencies,
e.g. mine
198
Letter
Watkins to Rycroft, 26 July 2002, ‘Iraq’.
246