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The Report of the Iraq Inquiry
“war‑fighting”, it could be enough to “sow the seeds of uncertainty in the minds of the
decision‑makers in Baghdad”.
465.  “In several significant ways,” the northern option was “very attractive”. It offered
the UK the “opportunity to make a discrete contribution to the operation, but it also offers
an opportunity to integrate other allies into the operation”. It would, however, be “highly
challenging” and would require “not only Turkish acquiescence, but also full Turkish
support along the line of communication”. That would require US involvement.
466.  Because “a good proportion of UK maritime and air assets” would be integrated
into the wider US effort, the force in the North would need to be confident that support
from the US would be available “as and when required”. That was an issue that
remained to be explored.
467.  Mr Bowen also reported that CENTCOM understood the strategic benefit of a
UK‑led “northern effort”, but it was “not yet clear how important it is to their overall plan”.
468.  Mr Bowen advised Mr Hoon that it was “also assessed as militarily unwise to
integrate anything less than a division into the US land component”, and that “it would
be militarily unattractive to commit UK land forces to US operations from Kuwait.”
469.  On 26 July, the MOD provided advice on options for a UK contribution to US‑led
military operations in Iraq in a letter to Mr Rycroft.198
470.  The MOD advised that US military planning was “in full swing but it was still
evolving”. The concept was for an attack launched by forces deployed in Kuwait and
from other Gulf States and from ships in the Gulf and elsewhere. The plan was “neither
fully developed nor finalised”. The Chiefs of Staff were “not yet able to judge whether this
is a winning concept”. Greater clarity would be needed “before any UK option could be
recommended”.
471.  The MOD stated that it was “clear that the US plan of attack from the South” did
not “need British land forces”:
“… in the time available there is very little scope for the preparation and integration
of British land forces into the US order of battle; moreover the logistic space
available in Kuwait, with five divisions worth of equipment and logistics support
entering through only one airhead and a single port would already be confined …”
472.  Adm Boyce had recommended three options:
Package 1: an “in‑place support package” using forces already in the region.
Package 2: an “enhanced support package” comprising Package 1 with
additional air and maritime forces. This package could include forces that would
be “of particular interest to the US because of their own deficiencies, e.g. mine
198 Letter Watkins to Rycroft, 26 July 2002, ‘Iraq’.
246
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