12.1 |
Security Sector Reform
1083.
A US Report to
Congress on 30 November stated that, in early October,
Prime
Minister
Maliki had said that political parties should eliminate their
militias or leave the
government.1001
It
added:
“However,
personnel with sectarian agendas remain within key ministries,
especially
the
Ministry of Interior. In addition, rivalries for the control of key
resources and the
central
government’s limited influence outside Baghdad undermine the
Government
of Iraq’s
ability to disband the militias …
“Despite
these legal and political prohibitions, militias and other small
armed groups
operate
openly, often with popular support, but outside formal public
security
structures.
These militias provide an element of protection for the
populace,
generally
on a sectarian or political basis. This is especially true in areas
where
there is a
perception that the Government of Iraq is unwilling or unable to
provide
effective
security for the population. Some militias also act as the security
arm of
an
organisation devoted to social relief and welfare, lending these
armed groups
further
legitimacy. Their continued existence challenges the legitimacy of
the
constitutional
government and provides a conduit for foreign interference.
Controlling
and
eventually eliminating militias is essential to meeting Iraq’s
near‑ and long‑term
security
requirements.”
1084.
On 1
September, an eGram from the British Embassy Baghdad reported
an
“important
step psychologically” for the Iraqi military: the Iraqi Ground
Forces Command
and IMOD
would commence “a staggered handover” of command and control
functions
from MNF‑I
on 3 September.1002
It would
begin with the 8th Division and other divisions
would
follow at a rate of one every two weeks until the end of the year.
The transfer
of 10th
Division was planned for January 2007and the final transfer, of the
Ramadi
Division,
was planned for April. MNF‑I forces were expected to retain
responsibility for
logistical
support and development.
1085.
The British
Embassy Baghdad reported that “while the assumption of
responsibility
looks gradual and sensibly phased, in reality the pace will be
demanding to
both MNF‑I
and the IGFC [Iraqi Ground Forces Command]”. As “life support and
logistics
capabilities”
were “developing at their own, much slower, pace”, it predicted
that “IA
Divisions
will remain dependent on MNF‑I for some time to come”.
1001
Report to
Congress, 30 November 2006, Measuring
Stability and Security in Iraq.
1002
eGram
38264/06 Baghdad to FCO, 1 September 2006, ‘Iraq: Iraqis to Take
Over Command and
Control of
its First Army Division’.
305