9.3  |  July 2004 to May 2005

40.  Mr Blair and President Bush spoke by video conference on 22 July.20 Mr Blair asked

about progress on the “Iraq Security Plan” and noted that:

“… showing progress on controlling the violence was the toughest issue – for the

UK public a real sense that Iraq was on the way to a peaceful future was essential.”

41.  An early draft of a security strategy for the IIG, drawn up by US, UK and Iraqi

representatives in Baghdad – but not seen by Prime Minister Allawi – was reviewed

by a meeting of senior officials chaired by Mr Bowen on 27 July.21

42.  At the meeting, Mr Blair’s Private Secretary said:

“… the Prime Minister believed the security strategy should be a key document in

communicating the IIG’s plans on security to the Iraqi people. The current draft was

not the document the PM was anticipating: it went much broader, and lacked detail

on plans to develop the security forces and Iraqiise security.”

43.  The meeting was told that work on Iraqiisation was being carried out by a separate

team, led by Lieutenant General David Petraeus, Commander Multi-National Security

Transition Command – Iraq (MNSTC-I). FCO officials were tasked to find out more detail

on that work, as well as on the budget to implement the strategy, whether the document

had Iraqi support and what US views were.

August 2004

44.  On 2 August, an MNF-I patrol passing near Muqtada al-Sadr’s house in Najaf

came under attack.22 Fighting within Najaf escalated and spread to other parts of Iraq,

particularly Baghdad but with sporadic attacks on the MNF-I and ISF in al-Kut, Nasiriyah,

al-Amara and Basra. This upsurge in violence within Shia areas coincided with a wider

deterioration in security in Sunni areas, in particular Samarra and Mosul.

45.  In a meeting with General George Casey, Commander of the Multi-National Force

– Iraq, and Lieutenant General John McColl, his deputy and the Senior British Military

Representative – Iraq (SBMR-I), on 4 August, Prime Minister Allawi thought it was

essential “to act decisively against the insurgency”.23 He commissioned an analysis of

the areas where the IIG and MNF-I could “match strength against insurgency weakness”

to achieve success. That should focus on Fallujah, Ramadi, Samarra, North Babil,

Baqubah and Baghdad.

46.  On 4 August, Secretary Powell told Mr Straw that he judged the situation in Sunni

areas to be:

20  Letter Phillipson to Adams, 22 July 2004, ‘Prime Minister’s VTC with President Bush, 22 July: Iraq

and MEPP’.

21  Minute Cabinet Office [junior official] to Sheinwald, 28 July 2004, ‘Iraq: Security Strategy’.

22  JIC Assessment, 11 August 2004, ‘Iraq Security: Shia Violence’.

23  Telegram 98 Baghdad to FCO London, 5 August 2004, ‘Iraq: Security: Briefing the Prime Minister’.

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