6.4 |
Planning and preparation for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, mid-2001
to January 2003
167.
Before Mr
Blair’s meeting with President Bush at Crawford, Mr
Hoon,
Mr Straw
and Sir Christopher Meyer expressed concern about the
potential
longer-term
implications of military action in Iraq.
168.
On 22 March,
Mr Hoon advised Mr Blair: “If a coalition takes control of Baghdad
…
it will
probably have to stay there for many years.”105
169.
In evidence to
the Inquiry, Mr Hoon recalled that he had pointed out
that:
“… we had
never successfully identified at that stage someone who might
replace
Saddam
Hussein. There was real concern about what Iraq might look like
in
the aftermath
of his regime being removed, and … that debate was a very
live
170.
Mr Straw wrote
to Mr Blair on 25 March, advising that the Government was a
long
way from
convincing the Parliamentary Labour Party that “the consequence of
military
action
really would be a compliant, law abiding replacement
government”.107
On
the
“big
question” of what military action would achieve, there was “a
larger hole … than on
anything”.
Mr Straw added: “Iraq has had no
history of
democracy so no-one has this
habit or
experience.”
171.
Sir
Christopher Meyer advised on 1 April that President Bush had
raised
expectations
that the US would take military action against Iraq in autumn 2002,
but
questions
were beginning to be asked about the risks.108
172.
Sir
Christopher Meyer reported:
“There is
no shortage of Bush insiders who tell us that the die is cast for a
regime-
change
operation of some sort this autumn. But there is now a sense that
the
Administration
are for the first time really staring the hard questions in the
face: how
much
international support is needed: what smart options are available
to topple
Saddam:
above all what happens afterwards. There is a doubt among some –
no
bigger than
a fist sized cloud on the horizon – that Iraq might be too risky
politically.”
173.
Sir
Christopher also offered advice on the US approach in Afghanistan,
where
decisions
had been taken:
“... in a
very small circle of key officials around the President. Where
Rumsfeld (and
General
[Tommy] Franks [Commander in Chief CENTCOM]) have not been
fully
engaged,
little action has resulted. Many in the Administration recognise
that, on the
ground,
there is a real danger of losing Afghanistan because of a US fear
of getting
sucked into
nation-building. But Rumsfeld has, in effect, blocked all but a
minimalist
approach.”
105
Minute Hoon
to Prime Minister, 22 March 2002, ‘Iraq’.
106
Public
hearing 19 January 2010, pages 108-109.
107
Minute
Straw to Prime Minister, 25 March 2002,
‘Crawford/Iraq’.
108
Telegram
451 Washington to FCO London, 1 April 2002, ‘PM’s Visit to Texas:
Bush and the War
on Terrorism’.
143