8 | The
invasion
94.
Shortly before
midnight on 19 March, the US informed Sir David Manning that
there
was to be a
change to the plan and US airstrikes would be launched at 0300 GMT
on
95.
From 0230 GMT,
targets in and around Baghdad were attacked by US
aircraft
and
TLAMs.58
The Iraqi
response to the attacks included firing five
surface-to-surface
missiles at
Kuwait.
96.
General
Richard Myers, Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, stated
that:
“… we took
advantage of a leadership target of opportunity in Baghdad.
Specifically
we struck
at one of the residences in south-eastern Baghdad, where we thought
the
[Iraqi]
leadership was congregated.” 59
97.
Gen Franks
described the intention of the attacks as “a true decapitation
strike”;
“Killing
Saddam Hussein and his two sons would cripple the
regime.” 60
98.
Gen Franks
recorded in his memoir that by 0900 (local time) on 20 March,
Special
Operations
forces in the western desert controlled 25 percent of Iraq. Special
Operations
forces in
the North had “linked up with Kurdish Peshmerga guerrillas and were
deployed
along the
Green Line separating the Kurdish Autonomous Zone (KAZ) from the
rest of
Iraq –
helping fix the enemy divisions in the north”.
99.
The main
invasion of Iraq began early on 20 March.
100.
Early on the
morning of 20 March, US forces (15 MEU) crossed into Iraq
and
seized the
port area of Umm Qasr before heading north, encountering stiff
resistance
but achieving
all their critical objectives ahead of time.61
101.
Adm Boyce
informed the Ad Hoc Meeting on Iraq on 20 March that, “with
reports
of the
disintegration of Iraqi units in the South, the Coalition was ready
for the possible
need to
intervene on the ground earlier than planned to stabilise the
situation”.62
102.
Cabinet was
informed of military developments on 20 March and told that
the
military
intention was to disable the command and control machinery as soon
as
possible as
it controlled the use of CBW.63
The main
operation would start very shortly.
The air
attack would look overwhelming in its scale and intensity, but it
was aimed
57
Letter
Manning to McDonald, 20 March 2003, ‘Iraq’.
58
Letter
Watkins to Manning, 20 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Military
Action’.
59
GlobalSecurity.org,
21 March 2003, DoD News
Briefing – Secretary Rumsfeld and General Myers.
60
Franks T
& McConnell M. American
Soldier. HarperCollins,
2004.
61
Ministry of
Defence, Operations
in Iraq: Lessons for the Future, December
2003.
62
Minutes, 20
March 2003, Ad Hoc Meeting on Iraq.
63
Cabinet
Conclusions, 20 March 2003.
19