8 | The
invasion
a go at
Basra because we could learn some lessons … and there may be
some
techniques
… that might be relevant for Baghdad’ …
“I then had
a sort of conversation with a friend of mine who was working in
General
McKiernan’s
headquarters. I said, you know, ‘Have I got this right, this is
my
thinking’,
and he said, ‘Actually the view here is that we would like you to
go into
Basra as
soon as you can’. So mindful of that, in early April … we were
doing a
number of
raids in and out of Basra to test how far we could go and I said to
the
commanding
officers ‘Well, you know, start pushing a bit further and a bit
further
and let’s
see how far we can go.” 264
423.
Major General
Albert Whitley, the Senior British Land Adviser to the
Coalition
Forces Land
Component Commander, told the Inquiry:
“As I
understand it there was no pressure from Whitehall or PJHQ to
influence
the timing
of the taking of Basra. Gen McKiernan also did not put
pressure
on Gen Brims
to take it early. I was present when he told Gen Brims
that
he
could take Basra when he was ready and it was not a necessary
precursor
424.
SIS2 told the
Inquiry that the Secret Intelligence Service had had “a pretty
good
war in
terms of providing intelligence support for British forces in the
South … the battle
for Basra …
That was an intelligence-led success.” 266
425.
Adm Boyce
informed the Ad Hoc Meeting on Iraq on 9 April that US
forces
controlled
all routes into Baghdad, where resistance was “spasmodic but
fierce”.267
In the
South, “US
forces would be sweeping south of Amara to meet up with British
forces
coming
north”.
426.
By 9 April, 16
Air Assault Brigade had deployed north of Basra to
al-Qurnah
(15km inside
the northern boundary of Basra province), with the Pathfinders (an
element
of the
Parachute Regiment) located 15km further north.268
427.
The COBR
evening round-up of key events on 9 April said the ICRC had
“reported
to DFID
violent looting in Baghdad, and an almost complete breakdown of law
and order
in many
areas”.269
Looting
also continued in Basra, Umm Qasr and elsewhere in the
South, with
the result that some water plants in Basra had become
unserviceable.
264
Private
hearing, 2 June 2010, page 33.
265
Statement,
25 January 2011, page 8.
266
Private
hearing, 2010, page 33.
267
Minutes, 9
April 2003, Ad Hoc Meeting on Iraq.
268
Minutes, 9
April 2003, Chiefs of Staff meeting.
269
Minute
Cabinet Office [junior official] to Manning, 9 April 2003, ‘Iraq:
COBR Round Up of Key
Events – 9
April’.
77