The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
91.
The paper said
that there was “no coalition-agreed blueprint” for how long
the
post-PIC
“overwatch” phase should last, observing: “The US has not addressed
this in
earnest, in
part because they see themselves maintaining a significant military
presence
in Iraq for
years to come (and tend to assume we will do
likewise).”
“But … we
already face a clear trend toward diminishing returns from our
efforts in
Southern
Iraq across the board. This is bound to accelerate when we withdraw
from
Basra City
…
“So we do
not believe the ‘overwatch’ period in Southern Iraq should be
envisaged
as lasting
more than a matter of months from the date of PIC in Basra
…
“Our
planning should assume that the UK civilian presence in Basra will
have to
be wound up
shortly before the removal of the UK military envelope which
enables
it to
operate (though if the US were to decide to move a military
presence of their
own to
Basra Air Station, and to retain a US civilian presence, we could
expect US
pressure
for us to maintain some sort of ongoing commitment to the Basra
Provincial
Reconstruction
Team).”
93.
The paper
recommended early engagement with the US on a renewed
political
strategy,
including a “change of Iraqi Government” and setting a date for
coalition troop
withdrawal.
94.
In the longer
term, the FCO and the MOD suggested that the UK would need
to
examine its
“core interests in Iraq … the assets at our disposal, and the
likely major
ongoing US
commitment”. Those core interests were likely to be:
•
preventing
AQ from establishing a base in Iraq from which to attack UK
interests;
•
maintaining
Iraq’s territorial integrity and deterring intervention by its
neighbours;
and
•
preserving
the stability of the region, and preventing disruption to
energy
supplies.
95.
The paper
argued for “a long-term UK commitment in Iraq”, which might
include:
•
niche
contributions to the US-led fight against AQ-I or in conducting air
strike
operations;
•
supporting
the Iraqi Navy in ensuring the security of the Northern Gulf and
the
protection
of key Iraqi oil infrastructure;
•
influencing
the Iraqi Government and supporting the long-term development
of
its
capacity, in particular through the provision of advice to central
government
Ministries
in Baghdad; and
•
developing
a bilateral defence relationship with the Iraqi
Government.
202