The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

• appointing a senior figure to lead CPA(South), where there were already

15 UK secondees; and

• leadership of four of the 18 CPA GTs scheduled to begin operations in

September, with deployment starting in late August.402

622. On 25 July, Sir Michael Jay informed Sir Andrew Turnbull and Permanent

Secretaries that Ministers had decided the UK would maintain “approximately the current

level of overall commitment” with a focus in Baghdad on Security Sector Reform, the

economic ministries and the oil sector, a “stronger lead” in CPA(South) and leadership

of four CPA GTs.403

623. Sir Hilary Synnott arrived in Basra as Head of CPA(South) on 30 July.404

624. On 24 September, Sir Jeremy Greenstock, the Prime Minister’s Special

Representative on Iraq, commented that the UK “has not yet put the intensity of

resources into the civilian side of our operation, in terms of both personnel and

project money, to convince the Americans that our analysis … has to be listened to”

(see Section 10.1).405

625. Sir Andrew Turnbull and Mr O’Donnell discussed the seniority of UK secondees to

the CPA on 11 November.406 They observed that the recent reorganisation of the CPA

(see Section 10.1) had left the UK with no UK officials at Director level and concluded

that: “It was difficult to continue to send staff as secondees if they were left with low level

roles only.”

626. Although the Treasury and Bank of England deployed only junior officials to Iraq,

they were noticeably effective (see Section 10.1).

627. A Treasury official speaking at a Treasury seminar in July 2004, said that securing

people with the right skills had been “paramount” in Iraq:

“… we didn’t have many people to deploy so we took care to second people who

could add value, and we are very fortunate in having a skill set within the Treasury

that was able to deploy effectively in the circumstances.” 407

628. Seniority was not a guarantee of influence.

629. In August 2003, officials informed Ministers that the UK was “seeking to engage the

US Administration and CPA leadership over oil sector issues in order to gain influence

402 Annotated Agenda, 17 July 2003, Ad Hoc Group on Iraq Rehabilitation meeting attaching Paper Iraq

Policy Unit, 14 July 2003, ‘Ad Hoc Ministerial Meeting: 17 July, (Annex C) Future Staffing of the CPA’.

403 Letter Jay to Turnbull, 25 July 2003, ‘Iraq: UK support for reconstruction’.

404 Synnott H. Bad Days in Basra: My Turbulent Time as Britain’s Man in Southern Iraq. I B Tauris & Co

Ltd., 2008.

405 Teleletter Greenstock to Sheinwald, 24 September 2003, [untitled].

406 Minute [unattributed and undated], ‘Sir Andrew Turnbull’s Bilateral with Gus O’Donnell 11 November

2003’.

407 Paper Radio Technical Services, 19 July 2004, ‘Transcript of Treasury Seminar Held in London on

Monday, 19 July 2004’.

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